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FOREWORD 
The Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public Affairs has 
established interdisciplinary research on policy problems 
as the core of its educational program. A major part of this 
program is the policy research project in which a team of 
several faculty members, each from a different profession 
or discipline, and graduate students with diverse back­
ground work together on an important public policy issue. 
These projects are conduct~d in response to public and 
governmental needs. 
This report on the public sector productivity programs 
was prepared by three members of the policy research 
project on State Governmental Operations. The project was 
undertaken in response to research needs of the Joint 
Advisory Committee on Government Operations, established 
by the 64th Texas Legislature to conduct an evaluation of 
Texas state government and make recommendations for 
needed changes. 
The intention of the LBJ School is to develop men and 
women with the capacity. to perform effectively in public 
service and to develop information that will enlighten and 
inform those in decision'-making roles. It is our hope that 
this report and others produced by the School will be of 





This study is the product of a team of graduate student 
members of a policy research project on State Governmental 
Operations conducted by the LBJ School 9f Public Affairs. 
It explores a variety of issues. which surround the design 
and implementation of productivity improvement programs 
in the public sector and examines · productivity efforts in 
the federal government and in state . government, with 
special reference to the · State of Wisconsin. From this 
examination, its authors draw. some lessons as to what 
might constitute an effective approach to productivity im~ 
provement efforts in ~tate government; Though written 
under the general direction of the research director, the 
findings and conclu~ions of the report represent the concen­
sus of the research team. 
This study was conducted at ·the request of the Texas 
Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, 
which provided staff assistance to the Texas Joint Advisory 
Committee on Government Operations during its delibera­
tions. The School's participation in this effort was made 
possible by grants from the Office of Community Service, . 
Coordinating Board, Texas College and University System 
of funds under Title I of the Higher Education Act of 1965 
and from the University Research Institute of the Univer­
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Several characteristics of the 1970s have given rise to the 
development of public sector productivity programs, in­
cluding an increasing number in state governm~nts. 
Exactly what is meant by the term "productivity" is 
subject to debate and will be covered in detail later in this 
report. Generally, the term refers to the attempt to maxi­
mize desired output and at the same time minimize total 
and unit cost. 
The recent proliferation of governmental productivity 
programs has been prompted by at least three factors: 
1. There has been a growing concern about the produc­
tivity of the American economy, fueled by a decline in U.S. 
productivity relative to other nations. The size to which the 
public sector has grown in terms of its percentage of the 
gross national product and employment makes this sector 
an important potential source for improvement of national 
productivity as a whole. 
2. The costs of providing public services have sky­
rocketed. Costs at the state level partieularly have risen in 
recent years because of an increase in the responsibilities of 
state governments, larger numbers of and higher compensa­
tion for state employees, and inflation. These trends have 
been accompanied in many states by a decline in state 
·revenues due to the recent economic recession. The result is 
that many states find themselves in severe fiscal difficulties. 
3. The demand for greater government accountability in 
general is increasing due to a concern for the size and role 
of "big government." 
This report discusses the meaning, history, and operation 
of productivity programs in the public sector, particularly 
with reference to state governments. This introduction is 
devoted to a discussion of the concept of productivity and 
an outline of the report. 
THE MEANING OF PRODUCTIVITY 
Productivity is both an economic and a management 
concept. In the economic sense, it refers to the combina­
tion nf resources used to produce goods or services. In the 
1~1anagemen t sense, the term refers to the adequacy of the 
way in which · a manager uses resources in order to produce 
spcdfic products and services. Productivity is a concept 
with different meanings depending on its particular applica­
tion. For this reason, any attempt to deal in depth with the 
issue must clearly define the terms employed and their use. 
Productivity will first be considered in the context of a 
simple system. Productivity measurement will be differen­
tiated from other management tools and will be seen as a 
component of an organization's information needs. The 
special need for such measurement in the public sector 
will be noted. Finally, the concept of a productivity im­
provement program will be introduced. 
Mark (1972) defines productivity as the efficiency with 
which output is produced by the resources utilized. Gissler 
(1972) notes the traditional definition as "output per 
man-hour." It is clear that these definitions imply a systems 
process in the traditional sense (see Churchman, 1961), i.e., 
an input-outpHt relationship. The system can be shown 
graphically: 
INPUT ---11- PROCESS ---i•• OUTPUT 
In the production system, inputs refer to such resources 
as personnel, space, and capital assets. Examples of outputs 
include physical goods, events, satisfaction, and services. 
Between . the input and the output is some process of 
transformation. Work processes, schedules, layouts, 
management-these are the tools which create the output 
from the inputs (Balk, 1975a). 
This simple systemic representation is sufficient to 
illustrate the more traditional definition of productivity. 
Various measures of productivity can be developed on the 
basis of this model. These measures attempt to compare the 
amount of resources used with the volume of products or 
services produced by the organization and thus to develop 
ratios of outputs to inputs. These are commonly known as 
efficiency measures. 
Two general types of efficiency or input-output ratios 
are appropriately used as productivity measures. First are 
"single factor" ratios. These ratios show the efficiency of 
production in terms of a single input. Two common single 
factor ratios are "labor productivity" indexes and "capital 
productivity" indexes (Wise and McGregor, 1976). 
Another such measure is output per energy input (Mark, 
1972). The second type of efficiency measure is "total 
factor" productivity (OMB, et al., 1973). This measure 
aggregates a number of inputs, provides weights for them, 
1 
Public Sector Productivity Programs 
and compares them to outputs. 
There arc other gauges of efficiency which are not true 
productivity measures but. due to their frequent confusion 
with productivity measures, need to be mentioned here. 
First, ··workload measures" show the amount of demand 
actually processed through the organization. Examples of 
such measures include number of licenses processed or 
social worker caseload. These measures show the magnitude 
of the expressed demand, but do not compare final output 
to input. 
A distinction also needs to be· made between true 
productivity measures and a secondary category of effi­
ciency estimates, "work measures." Work measurement 
refers to "the analysis of the stages of activity and the 
requirements at each of these stages" (Mark, 1972). A work 
measurement system sets standards of performance for each 
aspect of the job, e.g., how each activity should take. 
Thayer ( 1972) notes that such systems imply "Taylorist" 
speedups. The New York State Senate Task Force on 
Critical Problems (hereafter referred to as NYSSTF, 1975) 
suggests that negative connotations of productivity may be 
a result of confusion between true productivity measures 
and work measures. 
Efficiency ratios portray the traditional definition of 
productivity. However, several sources (Balk, 197 5; 
NYSSTF, 1975) have expressed dissatisfaction with the 
traditional definition since it fails to include quality 
considerations. Efficiency measures reveal how much of the 
good or service was produced but not how well it was 
rendered or performed. Balk (1975) suggests an addition to 
the simple systems model presented earlier: 
INPUTS--+PROCEss--.oUTPUTS+--STANDARDS 
Standards refer to the goals, objectives, or expectations 
of the organization. This comparison of outputs to stan­
dards brings into play consideration of effectiveness. 
Effectiveness measures attempt to describe how well 
something is done in respect to the organization's goals. An 
example of such a measure would be the "percent of clients 
of a vocational rehabilitation program that are employed as 
of 60 days after completing the program" (Urban Institute, 
1975). An efficiency measure for such a program, in 
contrast, might be limited to the number of clients 
pro<.:cssed in comparison to the costs involved. 
Balk (1975) argues that a comprehensive representation 
of productivity requires a combination of efficiency and 
effectiveness measures. He presents a simple equation to 
illustrate the concept: 
, PRODUCTIVITY = EFFICIENCY + EFFECTIVENESS 
Ha try and Fisk (1971) note that productivity measures 
which emphasize efficiency over effectiveness are "uninfor­
mative and even grossly misleading." 
Once measures are developed and implemented, Balk 
(197 5) lists five uses of the resulting data: 
I. Cost Reduction and Service Improvement: Studies of 
productivity relationships help managers to locate specific 
problem areas and take appropriate action. 
2. Ongoing Control of Operations: Productivity con­
cepts help managers gauge the effect of relocating resources 
and encourage the setting ofgoals. 
3. Planning and Budget Justification: As productivity 
data is collected and trends of efficiency and effectiveness 
are recorded, a rationale is developed to project future 
trends and rationalize budgetary allocations. 
4. Improvement Motivation: Productivity analysis 
results in the continuous development of performance 
standards and expectations which are communicable to 
employees and managers. This has a motivational effect of 
its own. 
5. Accountability: All of these uses enable government 
agencies to communicate their successes and problems in 
resource management to the executive, the legislature, and 
the public. 
The necessity for measurement of efficiency and effec­
tiveness is especially important in the public sector. In the 
business sector the profit statement reflects the fundamen­
tal viability of the enterprise or organization. The market 
mechanism will ultimately determine whether or not the 
private enterprise is efficient and effective in the produc­
tion of goods and services. Also, compared to governmental 
entities, the private firm provides a rather narrow range of 
products and services. Thus, the typical private enterprise 
finds itself in an environment in which it produces a limited 
group of specific and tangible products, in which it is 
guided by the overriding goal of profitability, and in which 
the market mechanism provides the appropriate feedback in 
determining efficiency and effectiveness. 
Government exists in a different environment. A wide 
variety of goods and services are provided by government, 
including the fulfillment of indefinite and changing social 
perceptions. No single overall goal, such as profitability, can 
be used as the standard of performance for the public 
organization. The goals and objectives of public organiza- . 
tion derive in part from notions of equality, democracy, and 
justice, which cannot be converted into a balance sheet. 
Furthermore, the public organization lacks a feedback 
mechanism as clear and demanding as the market in gauging 
efficiency and effectiveness. 
Despite these differences, government has a responsibility 
to use limited resources wisely, to strive toward the 
achievement of public ends, and to remain accountable for 
its performance. The measurement of productivity can thus 
serve a crucial function in the public sector by providing 
some indication of which programs are adequate and 
effective. 
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However, measurement alone will do nothing to improve 
program performance. It provides only a tool for locating 
problems in the system and indicating where management 
must intervene in the work process in order to make an 
organization more efficient or effective. 
Using only a traditional, efficiency-oriented definition of 
productivity will not be sufficient to maximize program 
performance. In fact, even measurements which allow for 
both efficiency and effectiveness will only serve an identifi­
cation function. A "productivity improvement program" 
moves beyond measurement to a strategy of intervention in 
the work process. 
FOCUS OF THE REPORT 
Chapter I of this report presents a history of the 
productivity movement in the Federal Government as a 
model of a productivity program from concept to . opera­
tion. After a look at the development of productivity 
efforts over the years, the development of productivity 
measurement in tlie last decade--ancf-a-half is traced. Next, 
current federal programs related to productivity enhance­
.. ment are described. Then federal programs which offer 
assistance to state and local governments are treated. 
Chapter II is devoted to the evolution of productivity 
improvement programs at the state level. Following an 
·account of the historical context, the status of productivity 
measurement in state governments is described. The next 
section is a summation of present improvement programs, 
including general conclusions drawn from the experiences 
of seven states. The chapter concludes with a detailed case 
study of productivity efforts in Wisconsin, which has 
instituted the best known program in this area. 
Chapter III provides an operational perspective on state 
government productivity programs. It represents the "les-
Introduction 
sons learned" from our surveys, interviews, and literature 
review. A beginning section discusses the conceptual and 
political requirements for starting a program. After a review 
of various structural concerns, the chapter discusses a large 
number of possible components of an enhancement effort. 
The concluding sections contain some thoughts on the 
crucial subjects of measurement systems and motivation. 
A comment about references is warranted. We have 
gained considerable insight from the documents examined 
in the course of our research, and we have drawn frequently 
and fruitfully upon these sources in preparing this report. 
Because it was not possible to .devote substantial attention 
to many topics mentioned herein, it is hoped that the 
reader will refer to the sources cited for more extensive 
examination .. 
We have attempted to attribute fully comments and 
ideas facilitated by the contributions of others. This 
attempt has been made difficult, however, due to the 
nature of our research. We have relied heavily on interviews 
and discussions, and on such sources as internal memoran­
da, budget documents, and unpublished material. Inevita­
bly, a great deal of our thinking has been shaped by a mix 
of various ideas. This is reflected in some sections of the 
report, particularly in the case study, where attribution is 
not fully possible. 
We would like to conclude this introduction by expres­
sing our appreciation to the many individuals who gave 
generously of their time and knowledge during the course 
of. our research. Particularly to be noted are those involved 
in developing and managing the productivity enhancement 
programs being started in state governments throughout the 
nation. It is our hope that this report adequately reflects 
the background and present circumstances of these efforts 
and contributes to their further refinement. 
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CHAPTER I 
-THE FEDERAL PRODUCTIVITY MOVEMENT 
BACKGROUND 
The awareness of the need for efficiency in government 
operations dates back to the founding fathers (Balk, 197 Sc); 
however, concerted efforts to improve Federal Government 
operations began in ihl.s century. Four high points of the 
public sector efficiency· movement will be discussed here: 
• The Taft Commission on Efficiency and Economy­
1972. 
• The Brownlow Commission-1936. 
• ·Two Hoover Commissions-1949 and 1955. 
• A steady stream of management improvement efforts 
beginning in the 1960s. 
The Taft Commission 
This commission was convened on March 8, 1911, to 
study ways of reorganizing the legislative and executive 
branches to facilitate an efficient budget system. The 
commission presented six recommendations-in 1912 dealing 
with the submission and format ofthe annual budget, the 
necessity for annual reports from the agencies, the necessity 
for uniform accounting procedures, and the necessity for an 
executive budget. President Taft presented the recommen­
dations to Congress in 1913, but nothing resulted from the 
study until the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921, which 
· created a national budget and the Bureau of the Budget to 
oversee the process. 
The Brownlow Commission 
Properly called the President's Committee on Adminis­
trative Management, the "Brownlow Commission" derives 
its popular name from its chairman, Louis Brownlow. This 
commission was appointed on March 22, 1936 to study 
executive branch operations. The commission was estab­
lished as a result of President Roosevelt's realization that 
the proliferation of New Deal programs had created 
administrative problems never before encountered. The 
recommendations of the commission included reorganizing 
the 100 or more independent federal agencies into 12 
. executive departments; strengthening the managerial 
agencies of the government; improving the merit system; 
and ·establishing a postaudit of all expenditures. Several of 
the recommendations were enacted in 1939. 
The Hoover Commissions · 
Named after chairman Herbert Hoover, the two Commis­
sions on the Organization of the Executive Branch of the 
Government called for greater power for executive depart­
ments rather than the fragmented bureaucracy extant at the 
time. This increased authority WaS generally to be achieved 
through consolidation · and reorganization of the depart­
ments. One important recommendation of the second 
Hoover Commission was the advisability of ·program 
budgeting over traditional budget systems. The adoption of 
this technique by the Defense Department in 1961 signaled 
the beginning 
government. 
of a new era of . program evaluation in 
Recent Developments 
Newland . (1976) notes five related trends in contem­
porary federal management: (I) productivity measurement; 
(2) planning, programming, budgeting (PPB); (3) manage­
ment by objectives (MBO); (4) performance evaluation; and 
(5) social indicators. 
The history of the productivity measurement effort in 
the Federal Government will be considered later in this 
report. It should be noted once again, however, that 
measurement is a necessary component of a productivity 
improvement program. Measurement can identify changes 
in productivity as a result of the use of other management 
tools. 
Planning, programming, budgeting (PPB) was installed 
in the Federal Government in 1965. It attempted to foster 
"rational" policy making through the use of cost-benefit 
analysis and similar tools. However, the system soon came 
into disfavor with many agencies. Several reasons for this 
disfavor, including excessive quantification, have been 
suggested. Newland (197 5) notes that it became associated 
with "time-consuming, rigid, and uniform "processes" 
which were inconsistent with day-to-day management. 
MBO was in operation in several agencies in 1970 when 
the movement to secure its adoption throughout govern­
4 
Federal Productivity Movement 
ment began. The agencies using MBO prior to 1970 were 
the General Accounting Office (GAO), Internal Revenue 
Service (IRS), National Park Service, and the Federal 
Aviation Agency. A Presidential order in 1973 marked the 
extension of the technique to all federal agencies; Newland 
( 1976) notes that the thrust of the MBO movement was to 
establish a method of continuous program review and 
clarification of program objectives. 
Several authors (Page and Sherwood, 1976; Newland, 
1976) point out the similarities in goals and proponents of 
MBO and PPB. (For a further discussion of the relationship 
of MBO and PPB see Public Administration Review's 
January -February, 1976 Symposium on MBO.) Where PPB 
was once viewed as "the answer to all our problems" 
(Havens, 1976), MBO and program budgeting are now 
viewed as "coexisting in the complex of federal manage­
ment budgeting and politics" (Newland, 197 6). 
· A fourth and related management development has been 
the growth of performance evaluation. Mccaffery (1976) 
points out that at least 37 laws requiring program evalua­
tion were passed from 1968-1972. The Legislative 
Reorganization Act of 1970 directed the GAO to include in 
its audits a review of program results. The GAO responded 
by publishing Standards for the Audit of Governmental 
Organizations, Programs, Activities, and Functions (1972). 
This publication outlines three types of reviews necessary in 
a governmental audit. First is the financial and compliance 
review. This is the traditional examination of the fiscal 
operations and &tatutory compliance of the agency. Second, 
an efficiency and economy review seeks to determine how 
well agency management has utilized inputs in producing its 
product. Third, the GAO calls for a review of program 
results to determine if desired outcomes are being achieved~ 
As a result of these standards, emphasis on programs (rather 
than traditional objects of expenditures) has increased, 
objective-setting has become more widespread, and mea­
surement has gained increasing attention (Newland, 1976). 
A fifth management technique is the attempt to 
quantify society's needs and trends via social indicators. 
Census reports and other private reports . fill the need for 
social indicators to a limited extent.* However, with the 
exception of one report published by the Office of Manage­
ment and Budget* (OMB), no coordinated federal effort to 
isolate and report on social indicators has been undertaken. 
*For example, Newland (1976) mentions the Monthly 
L'abor Review and the Annual Manpower Report of the 
President. 
*Statistical Policy Division, Office of Management and 
Budget, Social Indicators, 1973. (Washington, D. C.: U. S. 
Government Printing Office, 1973.) 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF 
PRODUCTIVITY MEASUREMENT 
Fabricant (1952) notes that the mechanization of 
production in the private sector prompted a number of 
statistical studies of man-hours compared to output in 
various industries. The governmental responsibility for the 
conduct of these early productivity studies was given to the 
Division of Productivity and Technological Developments 
of the Bureau of Labor Statistics. The Bureau's studies, 
which were confined to the ratio of inputs to outputs, were 
expanded in 1959 to include most major industries. 
Efforts to measure the productivity of government were 
limited to a few isolated attempts in scattered agencies 
during the 1950s. These measures were simple output-per­
employee figures. In 1960, John Kendrick, a consultant to 
the Bureau of the Budget, began calling for studies to 
determine "the feasibility of a program of productivity 
measurement in selected federal agencies" (Kendrick, 
1971 ). His ideas were presented at a management analysis 
conference in 1962 and soon gained wide acceptance. 
On October 11, 1962, President Kennedy issued a 
memorandum to all agency heads calling for improved 
personnel practices in order to minimize the cost of 
government services. One result of that memo and the 
increasing attention to Kendrick's ideas was the first 
attempt by the Federal Government to develop a pro­
. ductivity measurement program. The Bureau of the Budget 
undertook a five-agency effort . aimed at developing pro­
ductivity measures for each agency or its major com­
ponents. 
There were three objectives of the program: 
1. To determine in what kind of federal organizations 
productivity measurement may be feasible. 
2. To determine what is the most practical way of 
measuring Federal Government productivity. 
3. To determine in which areas of application produc­
tivity data promised to be most useful. 
The results of the study were (BOB, 1966): 
1. Valid . measures were developed in four of five 
agencies. 
2. In those four instances, indices were developed that 
measure the relationship of man-hours used to final 
products. 
3. In .some cases, measures of output to total resources 
used were developed. 
Four conclusions were reached: 
1. It is feasible to develop operational systems of 
productivity measurement. 
2. The principal requirement for measurement in an 
organization is that both its outputs and inputs can be 
measured. 
3. It is possible to develop a productivity measurement 
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system at a relatively low cost. 
4. Productivity data may provide both a useful sum­
mary indicator of the productivity of the organization and 
a framework for the evaluation and planning of produc­
tivity improvement. 
The success of the project would seem to dictate its 
immediate expansion. However, PPB was at the same time 
being formally adopted in federal agencies. The expertise 
of the analysts who had been working on the productivity 
measurement program was required to assist the PPB. 
movement. Thus, the measurement program was abandoned 
for several years. 
The rebirth of the program occurred in 1970 as a result 
of pressure from the Joint Economic Committee, chaired 
by Senator William Proxmire. Proxmire requested the 
General Accounting Office (GAO) to investigate the feasi­
bility of measuring productivity in the Federal Govern­
ment. The result of Proxmire's request was a three-phase 
effort under the leadership of an intragovernmental team of 
analysts representing GAO, OMB, and the Civil Service 
Commission. The three phases were (OMB, et al., 1973): 
Phase I: Determine the extent and use of measurement 
systems in the Federal Government. 
Phase II: Determine the feasibility of further developing 
productivity indices. 
Phase III: Refine the indices and implement improvements 
directed towards productivity enhancement. 
The conclusions from Phase I were that existing systems 
could generate enough data to construct a composite 
productivity index for the Federal Government and that a 
Joint Productivity Task Force should be established to 
begin the data collection process (Ardolini and Hohenstein, 
1974). The Phase I investigators found that over SO percent 
of the federal sector was covered by measurement systems 
but that little use of the measures was made by top 
management. 
In Phase II of the project, the interagency task force, 
assisted by the Bureau of Labor Statistics, began the effort 
to "develop overall productivity indices, to study ways to 
improve use of existing measurement systems, to study 
ways to improve use of unit cost measures and capital 
project planning, and to document and encourage good 
practices in applying measurement techniques" (Joint 
Financial Management Improvement Project (JFMIP], 
1974 ). The data for Phase II were obtained from 17 agencies 
and covered Fiscal Years 1967 to 1971. The data collected 
from the agencies represented 114 organizational elements, 
604 outputs, 1,560,000 total man-years and 54 percent of 
the civilian employment of the Federal Government 
(JFMIP, 1974). Besides the emphasis on traditional produc­
tivity measures (i.e., unit cost and efficiency data), the 
Phase II investigators placed great stress on effectiveness 
questions. Analysis of the Phase II data showed an average 
overall productivity growth of 1.9 percent a year (OMB, et 
al., 1973). 
Four major recommendations resulted from the Phase II 
effort. First, OMB should distribute guidelines for eval­
uating measurement systems to the agencies. Second, the 
Civil Service Commission should provide special training in 
productivity analysis. Third, the development of effective­
ness measures should be encouraged through assistance to 
agencies by OMB. Finally, a "productivity bank" should be 
considered for financing fast payback projects whose effect 
would be increased productivity. 
Phase III began on August 7, 1972, when OMB sent out 
a data call to all agencies having 200 or more employees. 
Specifically, agencies were to submit quantitative output 
measures for Fiscal Years 1967-1972, the related man-years 
of employment for each measure, the total wage cost 
associated with each measure, and comments on how the 
data were affected by work complexity, work quality, or 
other factors. Indices were then constructed and returned 
to agencies for verification. 
The expansion in coverage during Phase III is shown in 
Table 1-1: 
Table 1-1 
Comparison of Phase II and Phase III Coverage 
Coverage Achieved 
Phase II Phase III 
Item Base: 1967-71 Base: 1967-73 
Number of agencies 17 45 
Number of organizational 
elements 114 187 
Number of outputs 604 776 
Man-years 1,560,000 1,727,000 
Percentage of total 
man".years 54 60 
(Source: OMB et al., 1973) 
The overall annual increase in federal productivity from 
1967-1973 was found to be 1.68 percent. Cumulative gross 
savings attributable to productivity improvements were 
estimated to be $1.49 billion. 
Some of the conclusions of Phase III were (JFMIP, 
1974): 
1. It is practical to measure productivity for large 
segments of the federal sector and there should be a 
continuing program for measuring and enhancing 
productivity with an annual report to the President 
and the Congress. 
2. Productivity indices should be used primarily as 
trend indicators. 
3. The most important use of productivity indices is 
in analyzing the causes of productivity change. 
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4. It can be expected that there will be fluctuations 
both up and down, among federal activities from yea; 
to year. 
5 · The annual report should deal with trends in 
cross-agency functions rather than identifying in­
dividual agencies and activities. 
On the basis of the Phase Ill rec.onunendations OMB 
took action on July 9, 1973, to continue the measu;ement 
p~ogram and expand federal productivity improvement 
c I forts. Rcsponsi bilities were assigned to various agencies 
(JFMIP, 1974; Ink, 1974). OMB was placed in charge of 
general policy guidance for the project. Collection of data 
and construction of the productivity indices was the task 
of the Bureau of Labor Statistics. The Civil Service 
Commission was to oversee the personnel management 
aspects of productivity. The General Services Administra­
tion had responsibility for mechanization, measurement· 
facilities, and equipment. Finally, the Joint Financiai 
Management Improvement Program* was to coordinate the 
project and provide a report to Congress on the success of 
the effort. 
The federal productivity measurement effort has grown 
from a five-agency program in 1962 to a program covering 
more than 61 percent of federal employees today. The 
complexity of the measures now reflects increased concern 
with effectiveness and quality issues. Finally, as the next 
section will attempt to illustrate, the federal effort has 
moved beyond mere measurement to the beginning of a 
coordinated management improvement effort. 
CURRENT FEDERAL PRODUCTNITY-RELATED 
PROGRAMS 
Dunlop (1974) points out that in 1973 at least 19 
agencies of the Federal Government operated some 173 
programs (spending approximately $3 billion) which were 
felt to be directly improving productivity. The programs 
discussed here are those which have received the most 
attention. They will be discussed in two groups: (I) Those 
agency programs which are directly related to the formal 
federal productivity effort. (2) Various other federal 
programs which offer assistance to federal agencies, states, 
or localities. 
*The JFMIP is a joint program of the GAO, GSA, Civil 
Service Commission, Department of the Treasury, and 
O,MB. Its purpose is to promote the development and use of 
improved management techniques in planning, executing, 
and analysis of factors causing productivity change, prepa­
ration of the annual report, and expansion and refinement 
of measurement. 
Formal Agency Programs 
The agencies involved in the federal productivity effort 
have sought to meet their delegated responsibilities through 
a number of activities. 
1. Office of Jl,fanagement and Budget (OMB). As noted, 
the role of OMB is that of general policy guidance and 
coordination. Workshops to inform agencies of available 
technical assistance are also a responsibility of OMB. 
2. Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). BLS is responsible 
for the collection of the data used in the construction of 
the productivity indices. Other than that, its role in the 
interagency effort is limited. 
3. The Civil Service Commission (CSC). CSC performs 
several activities designed to enhance productivity in the 
public sector. Among them are: 
i. Clearinghouse on Productivity and Organizational Ef­
fectiveness. The purpose of the clearinghouse is the 
dissemination of information relating to the human aspects 
of productivity to all levels of the public sector. The 
clearinghouse is supplemented by the "Termtrex" data 
bank which places the most recent information on training 
and productivity measurement in the CSC library. 
ii. Research and demonstration efforts. Eight industrial 
and social psychologists are examining such techniques as job 
redesign, performance appraisal, and flexible working 
hours. The information will be channeled through the 
clearinghouse as conclusions are reached. 
iii. Bureau of Training. The Bureau is updating its 
curriculum to stress productivity issues. The Management 
Services Training Center has two courses which deal 
specifically with the concepts of productivity and produc­
tivity measurement, and several other courses designed to 
teach skills which will have an impact on the productivity 
of the organization. The courses are generally open to both 
federal and state administrators. 
The CSC is also reviewing contracts between the Federal 
Government and federal employee unions to determine the 
extent of productivity related provisions. Survey findings 
have shown such provisions were present in 35 of the 2,548 
contracts examined. The provisions generally deal with 
work standards and measurement, cost reduction programs, 
and labor-management productivity commissions. 
4. General Services Administration (GSA). GSA carries 
out a research function and serves as a clearinghouse for 
some technical aspects of productivity. Topics of interest 
include the collection of productivity measurement data, 
acquisition and management of capital investments, and the 
improvement of productivity work measures. The conclu­
sions of the research will be communicated through the 
CSC clearinghouse and serve as the basis for technical 
assistance. 
5. Joint Financial Management Improvement Program 
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(JFMJP). Besides ongoing analysis of the federal produc­
tivity indices. J FMIP is also active in encouraging the 
rcllnemcnt of productivity measures in state and local 
government. In conjunction with the National Center on 
Productivity and the International City Management Asso­
ciation, JFMIP has provided assistance to a number of Cities 
and two states. The assistance has been aimed at helping 
these jurisdictions develop productivity improvement pro­
grams. 
6. The National Center for Productivity and the Quality 
vf Work Life. The Center has supported the JFMIP with 
$50,000 in grants. Beyond that, the Center's support to the 
JFMIP project has been limited to occassional technical 
assistance. The Center was created by executive order on 
July 10, 1970, as the National Commission on Productivity 
to "point the way toward greater productivity growth" 
(Frank, 1972a). It was given statutory authority in 1971. 
The 13-member, blue-ribbon panel was provided a staff and 
directed to develop recommendations for productivity 
improvements for both public and private sectors. The 
Commission soon encountered substantial criticism due to 
its inactivity. From 1970 to 1972, the Commission mem­
bers met only three times (Business Week, 1974), although 
the staff undertook a number of studies. However, the 
Commission failed to translate the staff recommendations 
from those studies in to official recommendations. 
The result of the dissatisfaction with the Commission 
was Congressional refusal to renew its functions for a short 
time in 1974. During this time it continued to function as 
the Office of Productivity under the Cost of Living Council. 
When the Commission was reinstated as a Center on June 8, 
1974, its responsibilities were broadened to include im· 
proving the morale of the American worker. The increased 
responsibility was reflected by the addition of "Work 
Quality" to its title. Other changes included a budget 
increase to $2 million annually, expansion of the board to 
25 members, and the appointment of Vice-President 
Rockefeller as its chairman. 
Recent legislation has expanded the duties of the Center 
even further. Its new name, the National Center for 
Productivity and the Quality of Work Life, signifies a change 
to a more nearly permanent organization. The Center will . 
attempt to coordinate public and private productivity 
efforts and serve a strong public information function. 
Recently the Center has taken a more active role in 
providing information and technical assistance to state and 
local governments. In cooperation with the International 
City Management Association (ICMA), the Center publishes 
a,Jurisdictional Guide to Productivity Improvement. The 
guide seeks to provide information concerning innovative 
municipal projects designed to increase productivity. A 
'"Technical Report Clearinghouse" is also operated by the 
Center and ICMA to make available low-cost technical 
reports concerning the projects listed in the guide. 
The Center has also sponsored a number of workshops 
for state and local governments to provide technical 
infonnation about productivity measurement and incen­
tives and to provide a forum for the exchange of ideas. 
Finally, the Center has undertaken or supported research in 
a number of specific organizational areas. The results of 
these projects are then published by the Center and made 
available to interested persons. 
In summary, the role of the Center in research and 
public infonnation has become much more pronounced 
since its reorganization. The future plans of the Center 
include further expansion of these efforts. 
Other Federal Programs . 
Besides the agencies which have some direct responsi­
bility through the JFMIP and related programs, there are a 
number of ·other federal activities that deserve attention. 
Three such programs are conducted by (a) the National 
Science Foundation; (b) the Department of Health, Educa­
tion, and Welfare; and (c) the Department of Housing and 
Urban Development. 
1. National Sdence Foundation (NSF}. The NSF's 
Productivity Division has undertaken evaluations of the 
literature on productivity, job satisfaction, and industrial 
organization, as well as research on specific areas of 
government operations. The goal of the effort is to 
synthesize and distribute the Federal Government's store of 
productivity-related information ( Averch, 197 4 ). 
Grant monies are also available to organizations to 
support public sector productivity research. The Research 
Applied to National Needs (RANN) Program provides funds 
for the study of Social Systems and Human Resources. 
Elements of that program include productivity of service 
and delivery organizations, improving the use of resources, 
and economic productivity. A pilot program in Washington 
State (to develop human services delivery productivity 
measurements) was funded by RANN. 
2. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare 
(HEW). The JFMIP Report (1974) notes that HEW has 
three programs in operation to help states develop their 
administrative capacities. First, HEW is working on pro­
grams designed to help chief executives plan and operate 
human service programs. Second, HEW is trying to develop 
local information systems and effectiveness measures in 
order to build states' analytic capacity. Finally, through the 
Urban Observatory program, HEW is trying to relate the 
research and analytic capabilities of universities to local 
governments. 
3. Department of Housing and Urban Development 
(HUD}. Two HUD grant programs offer possible assistance 
to state or local governments. First, the "701" Compre­
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hensive Planning Assistance Program can be used to 
enhance public management capabilities. For example, a 
701 grant was used by the City of Palo Alto, California, to 
finance a productivity improvement program (Haywood, 
1976). Second, HUD has $1 million available , in the 
Community Development Block Grants Innovative Projects 
Program, which includes government productivity improv~­
ment as an eligible category. Monies are available for state 
or local projects that will decrease costs or increase 
quantity or quality of services. 
;ConcluSion 
The Federal Government operates many programs aimed 
at improving productivity at all levels of government. 
Dearly,, the, effort to improve the operation of governme~t 
;. has grown from occasional commissions and sporadic 
programs. to a concerted (if not totally coordinated) eff~rt. 
The goals for the future of the effort include the expansion 
of the measurement base within the federal sector and 
increased support for the efforts of state and local 
governments to enhance their productivity. 
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CHAPTER 11 
THE STATE PRODUCTIVITY MOVEMENT: 
WISCONSIN AS.A,CASE IN POINT 
: : 
BACKGROUND 
Productivity improvement in state government has 
paralleled to a considerable extent the experience of the 
Federal Government described in the previous chapter. 
State efforts at administrative reorganization began before 
the federal Taft Commission. The People's Power League of 
Oregon was the first state panel to study reorganization, 
publishing reports in 1909 and 1911 (Grant and Nixon, 
1975). As the influence of the Taft Commission spread 
throughout the states, however, the use of the commission 
to study efficiency and economy became a common 
organizational tool. By 1935, 30 states had investigated 
their state administration, and by 1938, 26 states had 
remodeled administrative structures in some way (Grant and 
Nixon, 1975). The two Hoover Commissions prompted 
similar flurries of administrative activity. By 1952 a total of 
33 states had established "Little Hoover" commissions. 
This trend has accelerated in recent years. Grant and Nixon 
point out that of the 37 substantial reorganizations in the 
history of state administration, one-third occurred between 
1965 and 1972. 
The evolution of specific management techniques at the 
state level also parallels the federal sector trend. The first 
state productivity measurement program was undertaken in 
New York State. Kendrick (1971) suggests that the effort 
was a result of the Bureau of the Budget's success in the 
1962 tests. Grant and Nixon note that as the "PPB effort 
gained national prominence through its use in the Defense 
Department ... the idea spread quickly to state and local 
governments." Between 1970 and 1974 more than a dozen 
states established performance evaluation divisions (Pierce, 
1975). The use of MBO and social indicators has also 
increased in state government management. 
PRODUCTIVITY MEASUREMENT IN 
STATE GOVERNMENT 
One of the first major attempts to identify the status of 
' productivity measurement in state governments was a 1975 
joint project of the Urban Institute and the National 
Association of State Budget Officers (NASBO). Funded by 
the National Commission on Productivity with additional 
assistance from HEW, the study surveyed budget officers in 
all 50 states and examined the states' budget documents to 
determine the frequency of use, sophistication, and inhib­
itors to efficiency and effectiveness measures. Thirty-two 
states responded to the survey. 
The findings of the study were not encouraging (Urban 
Institute, 1975). Specifically, the report found: 
1. The amount of productivity information, whether 
effectiveness or efficiency, appeared to be sparse in 
generally available state documents, especially state 
budget documents. 
2. The sophistication and adequacy of both effective­
ness and efficiency measures were found to be 
generally lacking. 
3. State budget officers did not feel they had sufficient 
information available to them on either efficiency or 
effectiveness. 
4. Some states felt information"'5haring programs among 
the states would be useful. 
5. A major problem seemed to be the failure to link 
program data to program outcomes. 
The study found that nowhere were there "productivity 
indices" similar to those at the federal level. Specific types 
of information lacking at the state level were noted: 
1. Degree of client improvement after clients have left 
state programs. 
2. Direct feedback from present clients and former 
clients, as to their satisfaction with state programs. 
3. Extent to which t}\e state is meeting the total relevant 
need in a program area. 
4. Accessibility to citizens of services. 
5. Effects on major clientele groups of various subdivi­
sions of the state. 
6. Efficiency measures that relate successful outcomes 
to inputs. 
7. Measures of unintended, detrimental effects of 
government programs. 
Data representing these topics were found to be seldom if 
ever employed. Table 11-1 shows the breakdown of budget 
officer satisfaction with current productivity measures. The 
table indicates significant dissatisfaction in most areas, 
especially with effectiveness measures. 
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TABLE 11-1 
Summary of Responses from State Budget Offices (32 states) to the question: "Please give us your ratings, from the point of 
view of the state budget office, of the adequacy of current efficiency and effectiveness measurement in your state." 
Efficiency Excellent Good Fair Poor No Opinion 
a. Transportation I 14 9 3 5 
b. Corrections I 4 13 9 5 
c. Health 0 8 16 1 7 
d. Education (Elementary & Sec.) 0 5 8 13 6 
e. Education (Higher) 0 9 7 11 5 
f. Parks & Recreation 1 10 10 6 5 
g. Economic Development 1 8 7 10 6 
h. Public Assistance 1 11 7 9 4 
l. Other Social Services 0 8 10 8 6 
j. Regulatory and Licensing 1 6 7 l 1 7 
Number of Responses 6 83 94 81 56 
Percentage of Total 1.9% 25.9% 29.4% 25.3% 17.5% 
Effectiveness Excellent Good Fair Poor No Opinion 
a. Transportation 0 7 9 10 6 
b. Corrections 0 2 14 1 1 5 
c. Health 0 4 12 10 6 
d. Education (Elementary & Sec.) 0 3 12 10 7 
e. Education (Higher) 0 6 8 12 6 
f. Parks & Recreation l 4 9 11 7 
g. Economic Development 1 5 9 11 6 
h. Public Assistance 0 4 9 15 4 
i. Other Social Services 0 2 10 14 6 
j. Regulatory and Licensing 0 4 5 14 9 
Number of Responses 2 41 97 118 62 
Percentage of Responses 0.6% 12.8% 30.3% 36.9% 19.4% 
Note: For the survey of state budget offices, higher education was added W the list of state services, and social services were 
divided into two components. 
Source: Urban Institute, The Status of Productivity Measurement in State Government. Washington, D.C.: Urban Institute, 
1975. 
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Many organizations have begun efforts to expand the 
use of productivity measures in state government. The 
Urban Institute, for example, has been conducting research 
in two states and and a number of cities in the use of 
clientele satisfaction studies to determine program effec­
tiveness. (This program is discussed in more detail in the 
Wisconsin case study to follow.) Several universities conduct ' 
research in the technical aspects of measurement and worker 
satisfaction. Cornell, UCLA, the University of.California at 
Berkeley, and Columbia all have such programs supported 
by the Ford Foundation (Averch, 1974). Two other major 
efforts are the State Government Productivity Research 
Project at the State University of New York (Albany) and 
the Quality of Work Center and the Institute for Social 
Research at the University of Michigan. Finally, such 
groups as the International City Managers Association, the 
Council of State Governments, and the National Associa­
tion of Counties have taken an interest in the area of 
productivity. Many have received funding from or are 
working in conjunction with another group. 
PRODUCTIVITY IMPROVEMENT PROGRAMS 
IN STATE GOVERNMENT 
The important distinction between productivity 
measurement and productivity improvement programs was 
introduced in Chapter I of this report. Productivity 
improvement programs in state governments are even less 
developed than productivity measurement. 
In 1974, the National Association of State Budget 
Officers (NASBO) surveyed the states to discover which of 
them had productivity programs. Seven, in addition to the 
District of Columbia, were listed as having such programs: 
Florida, Illinois, New York, Ohio, Vermont, Washington, 
and Wisconsin. In subsequent research, Minnesota was also 
found to be active in the area.* To discover the nature and 
scope of those programs, we contacted each of these states 
in December, 1975, and asked a series of questions designed 
to further specify their activities. Short descriptions of six 
of the state programs were developed and conclusions 
drawn about the general nature of the state productivity 
efforts. Those conclusions are presented here. 
General Conclusions. The conclusions drawn from this 
brief survey of state productivity efforts cover the fol­
lowing topics: (a) stimulus; (b) organizational location; (c) 
status of measurement; (d) use of the program; (e) savings 
accrued; (f) problems identified; and (g) advantages of the 
programs. 
*It was later discovered that North Carolina has also 
recently commenced a productivity program. However, 
time constraints prevented us from contacting that state 
during the study. 
Stimulus. Three main forces seem to lie behind these 
states' productivity programs. 
The late 1960s brought a movement toward program 
budgeting in these states. A program budget shifts the focus 
from budget inputs to program outputs. In many cases, 
output measures of agency activity were developed as part 
of the program budget process, thus laying the groundwork 
for productivity programs. 
. The e~dy 1970s bro~ght financial and revenue problems 
to many states. Development of productivity programs was 
seen as one way of making government more efficient and 
of doing "more with less." 
· Development of productivity programs in these states 
seems to have involved the support of an influential elected 
official. This is most frequently the governor, but can be a 
legislative leader or other persuasive official. 
' Location of the program. Productivity programs were 
generally housed in the office or unit responsible for 
formulation and execution of the budget. Only two of the 
states surveyed, Wisconsin and Minnesota, had productivity 
programs placed outside budget offices. However, both of 
these states used productivity programs in budgeting. Most 
of the states surveyed have a strong executive budget process, 
with productivity programs housed in the executive branch. 
Measurement. Because most of these programs are in 
their infancy. measurement technology is not far advanced. 
·Most state programs appear to be equipped to at least 
· crudely treat the efficiency part of productivity, but have 
not yet been able to address the effectiveness issue. 
Wisconsin, however, is currently attempting to develop 
quality-of-work measures and programs. 
The inputs to agency activity are defined largely as 
financial and personnel resources. Output measures, how­
ever, are generally developed by each agency, subject to the 
approval of the state budget office. Thus each agency uses 
different output measures which depend on the functions 
of the agency, and inter-agency productivity comparisons 
are difficult or impossible. 
Utilization. The states surveyed used productivity 
measures for a variety of purposes, but in all cases a main 
function of the productivity program was to provide 
information for budget purposes. Another use is the setting 
of performance targets for agencies, programs, or individ­
uals. A certain level of productivity, for example, might be 
expected of an agency in the following year. 
Further, incentive programs have been established in 
some states which credit productivity savings to employee 
salaries or agency budgets. These programs have met with 
varied success. 
Finally, productivity data allow for comparisons of 
actual agency or program performance with goals or targets, 
a key to effective evaluation. A significant gap between an 
agency's goals and its performance may be used as a kind of 
early warning signal. 
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Financial savings. Most of the states surveyed stated that 
their programs were too recent or undeveloped to identify 
financial savings resulting from their productivity efforts. 
Wisconsin, however, reported that 36 of 37 agencies had 
shown productivity increases and that 27 agencies together 
saved some $33 million in general purpose funds as a direct 
result of its state productivity program (Clark, 1975). 
Problems identified. All surveyed states have experi­
enced difficulties in establishing valid and reliable output 
measures. Some respondents indicated that there was a 
tendency to use indicators which put the agency in a good 
light, but which did not really reflect increased produc­
tivity. Most indicators seemed to be developed by trial and 
error. Adequate measures of quality of output (and thus of 
effectiveness) have not yet been developed, although, as 
reported above, Wisconsin is presently working on such 
indicators. 
Three additional problems were suggested by the survey, 
but were not specifically mentioned by the respondents. 
First, state agencies may have an incentive to be not 
entirely honest in their reporting. Though budget officers 
review the choice and reporting of indicators, program 
managers remain the most knowledgeable sources of pro­
gram information. If budget levels are dependent on 
demonstrated productivity, the incentive for deception is 
high. Second, if the search for qualitative measures fails, 
and quantitative measures are used in their place, it is 
possible that what appears as increased productivity may 
hide a deterioration in quality of service. Processing more 
clients, with less attention to the special needs of each, for 
example, may result in greater efficiency-but may not be 
in the public interest nor consistent with legislative intent. 
Third, it appears that some productivity programs have 
been developed without adequate investigation and plan­
ning, and that the difficulty of deriving suitable measures 
and productivity indicators has been underestimated. 
Advantages. Though few concrete savings have yet been 
reported, the claims of Wisconsin and New York at least 
suggest that productivity efforts may produce savings. 
Further, initiating productivity programs may sensitize 
agency heads and other executive branch officials to 
problems of waste and resource allocation. 
WISCONSIN'S PRODUCTIVITY PROGRAM 
Four factors were present in the early 1970s which 
significantly contributed to an appropriate climate for the 
Wisconsin state government productivity effort. First, 
Wisconsin had a tradition of competent, efficient, and 
innovative state government, a tradition of which its 
citizens were justifiably proud. The heritage of the Pro­
gressive movement (associated with the La Follette family) 
and other aspects of the state's political culture helped to 
create an emphasis on honest and accountable government 
that is unique in its pervasiveness. 
Second, the governor's tem1 of office had recently been 
increased from two to four years. With more time to 
devote to management issues, with a chance to see more 
goals accomplished in his term, and with additional free­
dom from political deadlines, the governor now had the 
necessary leeway to institute and oversee longer range 
programs. 
Third, the election of Patrick Lucey as governor in 1970 
brought to the office a man with extensive business as well 
as government experience. Though he assumed power in an 
era of major state government expansion, Governor Lucey 
was ahead of his time in emphasizing the need for austerity 
and productivity. Moreover, since he was known to be a 
liberal Democrat, his advocacy of "productivity" would 
spark less resistance from those who had been hostile to the 
"conservative cost-cutting" attempts of the Republican 
legislature in the late 1960s. 
Fourth, a declining rate of population and economic 
growth was fostering a changing mood among taxpayers; 
their expectations of government appeared to be shifting 
from more services to more efficiency. This demand for 
belt tightening, particularly noticeable in 1973 and beyond, 
made "austerity" a popular catchword instead of a cold­
hearted threat; 
The most important element was the leadership provided 
by the governor. In Governor Lucey's first State of the 
State Address, he spoke of the need for austerity in the face 
of growing inflation and unemployment. His administration 
pursued a course of "fiscal restraint" -a freeze on non­
essential state hiring; wage settlements well below private 
industry levels; a limited number of new programs; limits 
on spending of state funds by local government; and a 
merger of state higher educational institutions into one 
system. It is interesting to note that these actions in 
Lucey's first two years as governor occurred when 
Wisconsin's available revenues were still relatively large. 
Approximately $1 billion in surplus funds were used in 
these years primarily for local assistance (equalization of 
school financing; relief to property taxpayers; other state 
aids and shared tax payments). So the governor's rhetoric 
and actions in the name of austerity anticipated the 
worsening economic conditions, the coming fiscal crisis in 
many states and localities, and growing taxpayer concern 
about spending. 
Productivity Program: History and Concept 
What has come to be considered the Wisconsin "pro­
ductivity program" was introduced by Lucey in an April, 
1972, speech to the Milwaukee Chamber of Commerce. He 
outlined the need for state government to adopt produc­
tivity principles similar to those in the private sector. To 
carry out these principles, he stated that "as a matter of 
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public policy, all state agencies will be required to improve 
their management efficiency in the 1973-75 budget years, 
maintaining essential public services, but cutting service 
delivery costs by at least 2.5 percent annually." 
Governor Lucey emphasized the need to maintain the 
level and quality of important public services. The gover­
nor differentiated the productivity mandate from conven­
tional budget cuts which eliminate low-priority programs, 
reduce salaries, cut positions from the payroll, or other­
wise contribute to what he called "something with de­
servedly negative connotations-the speed-up." Instead, 
Lucey called upon state employees to "work smarter, not 
harder." 
The theoretical rationale for the 2.5 percent reduction in 
the base budget per annum during the 1973-1975 biennium 
has been explained by Robert Lampman (1972): 
This unique budget rule grows out of the insight that, 
since productivity increases at a yearly rate of 2.5% in 
the private economy, there is some ground for 
believing that public service agencies realize, or can be 
expected to realize, similar productivity gains. If they 
are, in fact, producing 2.5% more output each year 
with a given quantity of inputs, then it may follow 
that public agencies can produce a constant output 
year after year with 2.5% fewer inputs each year. In 
that case, taxpayers would capture the productivity 
gain in the form of reduced taxes. On the other hand, 
if public agencies are failing to achieve a productivity 
gain as high as 2.5% per year, then a base budget cut, 
according to spokesmen for the rule, will induce 
efforts by public managers to improve the rate of 
productivity gain of their agencies. 
The operation of the mandated productivity program 
was apparently based on two principles. First, by requiring 
agencies to reduce their budget base without reducing 
services, the program forced managers to be more efficient. 
Second, the governor and his staff did not impose their 
own ideas about where improvements should be made on 
the agencies. The agencies were directed to make these 
managerial decisions themselves. 
By forcing agencies to determine their own approaches 
toward meeting the productivity targets, the governor 
avoided the political mistake made by the Joint Finance 
Committee of the Wisconsin Legislature in the late 1960s. 
At that time, the Committee engaged in widespread 
budget-slashing of specific agency programs. This effort, 
which was considered arbitrary and punitive, was deeply 
resented by many administrators and elected officials. In 
addition to being politically shrewder, Lucey's mandate 
also was designed to encourage creative responses from the 
responsible agency managers who best understood the 
operations of their units. 
The productivity effort was to be conducted and 
coordinated through the Department of Administration. 
(Luccy's speech and directive apparently came as a surprise 
to department officials.) This department, which has been 
called the Wisconsin equivalent of the federal Office of 
Management and Budget, ltas statutory responsibilities to 
coordinate management services, to provide assistance to 
state agencies in a number of areas, and to conduct central 
budgeting, planning, accounting, engineering, purchasing, 
personnel, and records management functions. The depart­
ment's influence has grown in recent years because of its 
roles as the chief policy advisory arm of the governor and 
as the developer of the state program budget. 
Governor Lucey's productivity program was widely 
praised by citizens and the media as a decisive, tough, and 
innovative move. The key to this favorable reaction was 
that the program was promoted as an effort to increase 
government efficiency, not as a ruthless budget cut. By this 
time "austerity" and "productivity" were popular buzz 
words, and the governor was marching at the head of the 
parade with those words emblazoned on his banner. 
The response from some state agencies, however, was 
not as laudatory. After the growth psychology of the 
1960s, austerity was a shock to some state employees and 
to the advocates of some state programs. This organiza­
tional hostility became apparent when proposals were later 
presented to close institutions or reduce payrolls. But, the 
impact of employee resistance was relatively limited, 
perhaps because of the way in which the program was 
"sold" and because strong public employee unions were not 
yet a force to be contended with. 
Program Operation 
As mentioned previously, the Wisconsin productivity 
approach was built into the biennial budget-making process. 
The Governor, through the Department of Administration 
(DOA), directed all departments of the executive branch to 
reduce their base budgets by 2.5 percent each year during 
the 1973-1975 budget cycle. On a cumulative basis, this was 
a 5 percent reduction over the two-year period. The 
savings targets were to be realized during this period, so the 
agencies had some lead time to implement the necessary 
changes. 
Budgets of all general fund, program revenue, and 
segregrated fund state operations were included in this 
process. Debt service and costs identified as aid to 
individuals, organizations, and local governments were ex­
cluded from the mandatory reductions, although agencies 
were still expected to propose some means of controlling 
costs in the local assistance and aid to individuals cate­
gories. These categories, to be discussed later, are impor­
tant, because they comprise approximately two-thirds of 
the state budget. 
All agencies were asked to send proposals to DOA on 
how they could accomplish the savings. They were re­
minded that essential service levels were not to be cut. To 
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this end, the budget preparation instructions specifically 
differentiated "real" productivity from mere cost reduc­
tion. and emphasized that quality of services was also not 
to be reduced. Agencies were encouraged to organize 
productivity teams of supervisors and workers in all of their 
major work units. Budget and planning experts from DOA 
worked with the agencies to some extent to review policies 
and practices that affect productivity, and to validate 
responses developed to the instructions. 
The process by which this occurred varied from agency 
to agency, but two brief examples of agency responses may 
be illuminating. The Department of Health and Social 
Services, the largest state department in terms of expendi­
tures, did not create a department-wide productivity office 
nor a centralized program to meet the budget targets. Also, 
the department's budget officers were not the primary 
locus of responsibility for this effort. Instead, the mandate 
was passed further down to divisions, bureaus, and institu­
tions within the department. The impetus for developing 
proposals, and the extent to which the proposals were 
innovative and systematic, thus fell basically upon the 
various division leaders. 
The Department of Agriculture integrated the gover­
nor's directive with its internal management-by-objectives 
program. A decision was made to involve not only first-line 
supervisors, but also non-supervisory employees. A request 
for suggestions regarding productivity improvements 
brought a heavy response from employees. 
Agency productivity reports we.re submitted to the 
Department of Administration, which then earmarked the 
accepted productivity savin~ in the state's budget docu­
ment. The budget proposals were submitted to the Joint 
Finance Committee of the Wisconsin Legislature, and in 
tum to both houses. Despite criticisms that the cuts would 
reduce the quality of existing programs and cause new state 
needs to be ignored, the popular support for the austerity 
campaign carried the day. The 1973-1975 budget, featuring 
the productivity program, was adopted. 
The Wisconsin budget formulation system is a continu­
ing process. So, preparation soon began for the 1975-1977 
biennial budget. It was decided to continue the producti­
vity effort, although with some modifications. Experience 
with the earlier program led to several changes, reflected in 
the budget instructions for the next biennium. 
First, the amount of the mandated cut was decreased. 
Many agencies felt that the 1973-1975 program was a one­
time effort and were reluctant to continue the process. There 
was a widespread feeling among state employees that "the 
orange had been squeezed about as much as it can stand", 
al1d that further sizable cuts would cancel or dilute the 
quality of many programs or result in large-scale employee 
layoffs. 
Therefore, agendes were required to reduce base-year 
budgets by a minimum of I percent annually during the 
1975-1977 budget period, as opposed to the earlier 2.5 
percent. Again, there was an emphasis on the attainment of 
savings through real productivity improvements. Although 
this was a smaller figure than that of the previous budget 
period, the additional cuts were coming from an already 
reduced base. 
A second change occurred in the list of budget categories 
where cuts were mandatory. Under the new instructions, 
only state operations funded by general purpose revenues 
were required to submit productivity improvements in their 
budgets. Segregated and program revenue funded agencies 
were asked to utilize the productivity improvement policy 
"to the extent possible". As before, aid to local govern­
ments and individuals was excluded. 
Third, agencies were encouraged to propose reinvest­
ments of up to one-half of the total productivity savings for 
management improvements and innovative program 
changes, as long as the minimum 1 percent net reduction 
was maintained. The reinvestment feature was designed to 
encourage more creative responses as part of a long-range 
management improvement effort. Because of its unique 
nature, the program deserves detailed attention. 
The objectives of the Productivity Reinvestment Pro­
gram were enumerated in a July 23, 1974 memorandum to 
all agency heads from then DOA Secretary Joe Nussbaum: 
• Innovative changes in program operations, such as 
a demonstration p;roject, which offers the poten­
tial for future productivity improvement or more 
effective delivery of services; 
• Investment in management improvements, such as 
training and development of managers, manage­
ment and activity information systems and 
projects, and productivity related equipment 
purchases; 
• Investment to accomplish other 1975-1977 execu­
tive policies, such as conversion of facilities to 
improve their utilization and means of increasing 
federal support for state programs; and 
• Improved means of measuring and evaluting the 
results of public programs. 
The productivity savings were to be reinvested on this 
basis: 
0-1 % savings over the previous year 0%for 
reinvestment 
1-2% savings over the previous year 100% of the 
savings reinvested 
2% + savings over the previous year 50% of the 
savings reinvested 
The program received substantial publicity, but met with 
limited success. Only four agencies identified sufficient 
savings to qualify for productivity reinvestment. These 
agencies' funds were placed in reserve for their use 
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according to the guidelines. During the 1975-1977 budget 
hearings, the Legislature was under pressure to cut expendi­
tures and saw the proposed reinvestments as unnecessary 
new programs. The savings which had been earmarked for 
the agencies were thus removed, causing those agencies 
which had participated to become disillusioned with the 
reinvestment program. Had additional legislative input been 
sought at the beginning of the program, the savings may not 
have been cut. 
Fourth, agencies were asked to identify the 10 percent 
of their programs that had the lowest priority in terms of 
departmental objectives. Although the precise intent behind 
this request is not known, Governor Lucey's 1975 remarks 
on the subject of public priorities in an age of austerity 
may shed some light: 
Government at all levels will have to d~velop the 
capacity to admit failure ... to acknowledge that 
there are some jobs that government is currently 
doing that are so marginal or are b~ing done so 
inefficiently that we should phase them out. We must 
also recognize that some services we have tradition­
ally provided may now be outmoded or less 
important than others which also make a claim on 
limited revenue sources ... We should be seeking a 
lean government ... that can shift its resources to the 
most compelling needs of its citizens without adding 
to a tax burden that is already too high. 
So the mandated productivity goals were again sent to 
the agencies, answered, and sent on to the Legislature. By 
this time, the full force of the recession, the taxpayer 
revolt, and the spreading governmental fiscal crisis had hit 
Wisconsin, making Governor Lucey's call for a "lean years" 
budget particularly appropriate. After a long and stormy 
battle in the Joint Finance Committee and in the Legisla­
ture, the budget, with its new productivity program 
partially intact, was adopted. 
EXAMPLES OF PRODUCTIVITY SAVINGS 
AND PROGRAMS 
Agency Responses 
Some agencies did make productivity savings. For ex­
ample, in the Department of Health and Social Services, 
savings were made by the institution of technological 
improvements in health services and through the reloca­
tion of regional vocational rehabilitation headquarters. 
Savings were achieved in the Family Services Division 
by a functional job analysis which reviewed civil service 
job classifications against job descriptions prepared by 
eplployees in those classifications and by using more 
paraprofessionals in client services. The department also 
switched its computer operations from cards to tapes, with · 
a substantial savings in salaries. The caseload of probation 
and parole officers was increased from 40 to 44, with 
resulting savings in salaries. Substantial savings were found 
by reducing mileage traveled by department employees and 
by reducing energy consumption in institutions. 
The Department of Transportation insisted that county 
governments performing contract maintenance work on 
state roads use only one man per truck. The department 
also made savings by switching computer operations from 
keypunch to tape, and by measuring the programmers' 
output and accuracy at various tasks and redeploying the 
work force in line with the results. In addition, the depart­
ment measured the performance of its troopers (as to the 
type and number of violations reported), driver' license 
examiners, and engineers, and made the necessary adjust­
ments. 
The Office of the Commissioner of Banking established a 
new field office in Milwaukee, resulting in an increase in 
service at an overall savings in cost. Bank examiners 
operating out of Madison previously spent considerable 
time traveling to Milwaukee. The establishment of the 
Milwaukee office reduced travel costs while allowing more 
time for bank examination. 
The Office of the Commission of Credit Unions now 
uses a statistic~! sampling procedure to check accounts, 
rather than checking each one individually. This provides 
the same general results, but offers a broader statewide 
program requiring fewer personnel. 
The Department of Natural Resources expanded its 
central automotive pool to include trucks and other 
equipment. It reorganized its fish and game staff, consoli­
dating the divisions into one bureau. It reduced the number 
of forestry bureaus from two to one. The department also 
improved management of its workload and used limited 
term rather than seasonal employees in some jobs. 
The University of Wisconsin system instituted an annual 
curriculum and degree program review which eliminated a 
number of low-priority courses and programs not attracting 
sufficient student participation. The university system is 
engaging in regional planning emphasizing the development 
of academic specialty areas by individual campuses. The 
long-range intent is to eliminate duplication of specialized 
curricula at several regional campuses. 
The university system is also developing a highly 
efficient inter-library loan program. By the use of com­
puters, individual campuses will have access to the library 
resources of the entire system, thereby reducing substan­
tially the book-buying requirements. Other university 
consortia save resources by sharing faculty members and 
videotape facilities. 
Savings were attained in the university system by greater 
use of computers, closed-circuit television~ and other 
technology for instructional purposes. The Higher Educa­
tion Aids Board accelerated loan collections and returned 
the balance in its revolving account to the state as a 
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productivity contribution. The system's energy conserva­
tion policy resulted in annual savings of $1.5 million. 
The most controversial aspect of the university's 
response to the productivity mandate involved increased 
faculty teaching loads, part-time teaching assignments for 
some administrators, and, particularly significant, layoffs of 
faculty and staff members. Over a four-year period, 1,132 
positions were vacated. While many of the layoffs could be 
contributed to a decline in enrollment, some must be 
attributed to the productivity-inspired budget cuts. (In 
practice, of course, it is difficult to separate the causes.) 
Most of the layoffs applied to faculty and academic staff, 
while attrition was used to reduce the number of classified 
employees. Many of the tenured faculty who were laid off 
have been rehired, some after retraining and relocating in 
the system. The personnel cutbacks led to a law suit and 
charges that the quality of instruction has deteriorated. 
Larry Clark of Wisconsin's Department of Administra­
tion, described general agency patterns of response to the 
productivity mandate (1975): 
1. The administrative department with the biggest 
budget-Health and Social Services; $1 billion-had 
the largest percent savings except for one new 
department. This may indicate that the bigger the 
department, the more fat to be trimmed. The De­
partment of Health and Social Seivices 'saved' $11.8 
million for the biennium, 11.9 percent of its base bud­
get for agency operations. Only the Department of 
Business Development had a higher gross percentage 
savings, 15.9 percent. Business Development has 18 
employees compared to 9,689 in Health and Social 
Services. 
2. Most of the other departments stayed around the 
7 percent savings mark for a cumulative total. 
3. Independent departments which traditionally have 
had strong, special interest constituencies made an 
average effort. Included in this category is the 
university system, one segment of government over 
which Wisconsin's chief executive has little budgetary 
influence. 
Overall, it is difficult to generalize about which func­
tional activities . bore the brunt of the forced budget 
reductions over the four-year period. There was no clear, 
consistent tendency for one area of expenditure to be 
called upon to supply the savings. 
Some agencies concentrated on more stringent allocation 
of supplies, equipment, and travel opportunities. Purchases 
were deferred and employees placed in smaller offices. A 
smaller number of agencies instituted technological 
improvements, restructured their internal units, or 
expanded their planning and control capabilities. 
Other agencies emphasized personnel savings. Since the 
vast majority of expenditures for state operations is taken 
up by personnel costs, productivity efforts were especially 
felt in this area. But with the exception of the university 
system, the savings were apparently not realized through 
layoffs or higher workloads for the most part. 
In his 1976 State of the State Address, Governor Lucey 
noted that the number of state employees remained 
essentially stable after five years of austerity. It appears 
that the bulk of personnel cuts was achieved by attrition, 
absorbing or freezing vacant positions rather than attempt­
ing to fill them. Other savings were attained through the 
redeployment or reclassification of positions. The layoffs 
which did occur could have been due to the recession or 
declining institutional populations. 
DOA Role 
As previously noted, the Department of Admjnistration 
provides management services and coordination for 
Wisconsin's agencies and serves as the governor's staff for 
budgeting, planning, and other executive responsibilities. 
Therefore, it was logical that the productivity effort should 
be coordinated through this agency. (The success of DOA's 
coordination effort will be discussed later.) 
DOA responded to the governor's emphasis on prod ucti­
vity in a number of ways in addition to the activities 
already noted. A major priority was the implementation of 
Section 16.42 of the Wisconsin Statutes, which requires 
that all agencies submit to DOA a clear statement of 
purpose for each program or subprogram, specific objec­
tives and proposed dates of achievement, plans for 
implementation and resources needed, legislation required 
to carry out the program, and information pertaining to 
fiscal impact. In short, the statute requires comprehensive 
goal setting and planning. 
Not surprisingly, this statute has caused some difficul­
ties. First, it involves an enormous amount of work. Most 
agencies had never attempted such an exercise. Second, 
how the information will be used is not clear. Finally, the 
statute does not contain any means of forcing compliance. 
The result has been only a minimal satisfaction of the 
statutory requirements to date. 
The Legislative Audit Bureau (LAB), sensing these 
difficulties, requested legislation giving it authority to 
establish goals, objectives, and performance standards for 
those agencies which had not already done so. Such 
legislation was passed in 197 5. However, some feel this was 
not adequate, since it does not address the inherent 
difficulties in establishing goals and objectives and may, in 
fact, be an inappropriate responsibility for an auditor, who 
will eventually have to evaluate the goals he or she may 
have established. 
Three other programs illustrate the range of DOA 
responses to the productivity effort. First, the Employee 
Relations Division's Bureau of Human Resources operates a 
Career Executive Development Program. The program seeks 
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to provide broad experience to management talent seeking 
a career in Wisconsin government. Associated with the 
program is the Executive Assessment Center. Those who 
attend the center are tested on their ability in certain 
management functions (e.g., risk-taking); A profile of scores 
for each participant is developed and subsequent workshops 
are planned to supplement managers' skills in weak areas. 
Second, the State Employees Medt Award Board 
administers an award program to encourage unusual and 
meritorious suggestions and accomplishments by state 
employees, thus promoting efficiency and economy in the 
performance of the functions of state government. Since 
the establishment of the Labor-Management Productivity 
Commission (to be discussed later), the amount of money 
budgeted for merit awards has significantly decreased. This 
is due to the state employee unions' desire to have 
across-die-board pay increases. Only non.contract 
employees. are now included in the program. The annual 
budget has decreased to . $6,000. . 
Third, the Urban Institute is presently conducting an . 
experimental program in cooperation with the DOA. The 
Institute provides technical assistance and funds for the 
development of new effectiveness measures in certain areas. 
The measures will include client surv~ys and follow-ups, 
among other devices. Indicators are being develope~ for 
such agencies as the Department of Transportation and the 
Department of Health ~nd Social Services' Family Services 
Division and Corrections and Parole.Division. 
Legislative Response 
1. Legislative Audit Bureau (LAB). The role of the LAB 
in relation to Section 16.42 has already been mentioned. 
The bulk of LAB's productivity-related effort, however, is 
devoted to performance auditing. Iti 197 5, 26 perfonnance 
audits were conducted. Agencies to be audited · may be 
selected in a number of ways: potential for increased 
efficiency; potential for increased effectiveness; degree to 
which the program can be affected by management 
· decisions; statutory requirements; ' LAB time constraints; 
agency size; requests or complaints; follow-ups; or needs of 
department. 
, When an agency appears "healthy" as a result of an 
audit, this implies: (1) its operations meet legislative intent, 
(2) its goals and objectives match, and (3) its performance 
and measurement criteria are effective. If an agency does 
not appear "healthy", a report to the leg!slature provides 
information and recommendations. 
2. Legislative Fiscal Bureau ( LFB ). Among other 
responsibilities, the LFB provides fiscal and program 
analysis for the legislature and its appropriate committees 
when requested. These reports . may focus . on agency 
productivity. The LFB also prepares . and . submits the 
Legislative Budget Document. 
3. The Legislative Council. The principal function of the 
Legislative Council is to give careful study to various 
problems of government and present the results to the 
Legislature. Council committees investigate specific prob­
lems and formulate reports. Two of these committees may 
have some relationship to the productivity programs. First, 
the Review of Performance and Program Audit Procedures 
Subcommittee is wrestling with the problems of Section 
16.42 ·discussed earlier. Second, the Collective Bargaining 
Impasses in Public Employment Subcommittee may have to 
deal with questions raised by the Joint Labor-Management 
Productivity Commission, to be discussed later. 
Other Important Programs 
.Two programs are not readily classified but deserve 
mention~The Labor~Management Productivity Commission 
and The Administrative Officers Council. 
1. The Labor-Management Productivity Commission. 
During the last round of state employee contract negotia­
tions, this Commission was established to solicit, suggestions 
for productivity improvement and distribute verified sav~ 
ings from the adoped suggestions back to union members. 
Savirlgs accruing from an employee's suggestion are evenly 
divided among all the union members in the state. 
some observers have voiced doubts about the effective­
ness of the program although it is only. now beginning to 
function. There are 30,000 state employees in Wisconsin. lri 
order to provide adequate savings to make the reimburse­
ments a real incentive to suggestions, substantial areas of 
expenditure will have to be affected. The most substantial 
area of state expenditure is, of course, personnel. It is 
doubtful that union suggestions would result in the sizable . . . . . 
reductfon of personnel costs. Therefore, the future· of the 
progtam does not seem bright. . 
2. The Administrative Officers Council (AOC). The 
AOC is a council composed of the heads of adijlinistrative 
agencies. These individuclls have recently become interested 
in the area of productivity. A definition of that term has 
been established and a committee on the subject has been 
organized. 'The Council promises to play a vital role in the 
future clarification and coordination of productivity efforts 
in Wisconsin. 
ASSESSMENT OF WISCONSIN'S PRODUCTIVITY 
PROGRAM 
Positive Impacts 
The Wisconsin experience with productivity can be 
credited. with a number of important accomplishments. 
During the 1973-1975 biennium, 36 of the 37 agencies 
(regardless of source of funding) showed productivity 
savings. Twenty-seven of 28 agencies using only general 
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purpose revenues (from state sales and income taxes and 
state fees) saved $33 million according to DOA figures. If 
all agencies meet the required savings during the current 
biennium, this will mean that over the four-year period at 
least 10.5 percent of the beginning base budget of the 
programs involved in the effort will have been cut. 
Moreover, these reductions in costs were apparently not 
accompanied by an overall decline in the quality or level of 
services provided by state government. Several state 
employees claimed that the cuts had reduced agency 
performance, but admitted that their claims were difficult 
to document. The more common reaction was that if any 
deterioration of quality had occurred, it was minor and 
affected by variables other than productivity cuts. The 
absence of comprehensive, dependable evaluation informa­
tion makes judgement on this subject especially difficult. 
Some modifications in program operations, especially 
the elimination of wasteful or unnecessary practices, were 
adopted in the name of enhanced efficiency. In addition, a 
pervasive awareness of the need for austerity and a 
widespread concern for productivity have spread through 
much of the state bureaucracy and have been supported by 
public opinion. It has prompted several attempts at 
far-reaching changes in certain areas of state government. 
The strongest case for the positive impact of Wisconsin's 
program has been made, not surprisingly, by Governor 
Lucey. In describing the impact of the austerity campaign, 
he recently noted (1976): 
The decisions we have made in the last five years, 
however painful, have enabled Wisconsin to weather 
the nation's economic troubles without the drastic 
and devastating actions that the times have required 
of other states ... Over the past two years, more than 
20 states increased taxes. Wisconsin has not. 
Wisconsin will not ... Many states and municipalities 
have been forced to increase their borrowing substan­
tially, sometimes just to cover operating 
costs ... Wisconsin, however, has resisted the tempta­
tion to borrow beyond its means ... When the state 
does borrow, the interest rate is low because of the 
state's reputation for fiscal integrity ... To balance 
the budget, some states have had to resort to massive 
public employee layoffs and wholesale reductions in 
state programs ... Wisconsin has fared much better. 
Local assistance, school aids, and property tax relief 
are all at record levels. The Homestead Tax Credit 
Program is helping more people than ever before. The 
number of state employees has remained essentially 
stable ·... 
Five years of austere and moderate public policy have 
served us well ... This year, many states must ask 
themselves whether they can continue to provide 
, some vital public services. Wisconsin can ask itself 
how to continue to deliver all its essential services 
more effectively and more efficiently. 
Of course, these results cannot be attributed solely to 
the productivity program. Some of the cost savings were 
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due to other factors. Some agencies would have adopted 
innovative changes without the call for productivity from 
the Governor and DOA. But it seems clear that the 
statewide scope and significant proportions of the improve­
ments would not have occurred without the leadership of 
the governor and the heavily publicized thrust for produc­
tivity. Such widespread savings and management reforms 
are not a normal phenomenon in state government. 
Negative Impacts 
The Wisconsin productivity program was not without 
shortcomings, which limited its effectiveness and prevented 
it from realizing its full potential. 
Problems plagued the productivity effort from the 
beginning and deserve to be understood in any account of 
the Wisconsin experience. In the first place, conceptual 
confusion limited the program's effect. Clarity of purpose is 
important in any such undertaking. First, it facilitates 
communication among those involved. Second, it minimizes 
possible frustration with the program if all have a clear 
understanding of their role. Third, it enables meaningful 
evaluation of the program as to its successes and failures. 
Unfortunately, this clarity was lacking in Wisconsin since 
the term "productivity" and the purposes of the program 
associated with that term were not commonly understood. 
In Wisconsin, no operational, consistent definition of 
productivity emerged. Different individuals defined the 
term and interpreted the governor's program in diverse 
ways. This confusion explains in part the diversity of 
agency approaches to the productivity mandate. A lack of 
consensus has also been noted within agencies or even 
among personnel in particular programs. 
A few top administrators in DOA and elsewhere had a 
relatively clear, well-developed vision of productivity 
improvement. Productivity, as defined by these administra­
tors, involved both the efficiency and effectiveness of state 
government. The goals of the program, according to these 
leaders, entailed a comprehensive effort including both 
management development and budget accountability. 
However, the emphasis of the program as it was 
communicated to the agencies was on maintaining services 
at less cost. There did not seem to be a systematic attempt 
to articulate the broader definitions and goals, or at least 
these concepts were not generally understood at the agency 
level. More importantly, the necessary motivation, consulta­
tion, and support services for the development of a more 
comprehensive program were not present. 
The result was that the governor's program was widely 
viewed by state employees as simply a series of budget cuts. 
This perception, as shall be seen, was not far from the 
mark, because "productivity" in many ways was a slogan 
and a selling point rather than a well-conceived package of 
reforms. 
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This points to a second major weakness of the program: 
the Wisconsin effort lacked detailed preliminary or ongoing 
planning and a long-range perspective. There was not a 
careful analysis prior to program implementation to ensure 
that the resulting efforts were well-conceived, clearly articu­
lated, or widely accepted. Rather, the program can be 
characterized as a "quick and dirty" response to guber­
natorial urging. Agencies were cognizant of this perspective, 
for most employees saw the productivity program of 1973­
197 5 was an isolated, one-time effort, and tended to react 
accordingly. 
DOA was aware of this shortcoming, and attempted to 
adopt a longer-range viewpoint in planning for the 
1975-1977 productivity program. The reinvestment option 
with its promise of future savings, was one indication. Also, 
the department instituted a statewide management im­
provement program in 1974, although the fruits of this 
endeavor are not yet apparent to the outside observer. 
Of course, there are restraints on state government that 
make long-range planning hazardous. These include the 
legal inability to commit resources beyond a limited period 
of time; uncertainty about the state's future fiscal picture 
or program needs; the short-range perspective of elected 
officials; the pressures from interest groups demanding 
immediate action; and the traditional attitudes of many 
bureaucrats. In short, the overall atmosphere of state 
government is not conducive to long-term planning and this 
was reflected in the Wisconsin experience. 
Third, as noted, this was not a comprehensive produc­
tivity campaign. It was not directed at discovering and 
correcting systematic barriers to productivity improvement, 
nor was there a vigorous examination of the various 
elements that contribute to a "productive" agency, includ­
ing both efficiency and effectiveness. The Wisconsin 
experience can be seen as a somewhat successful effort to 
eliminate "fat" in agency budgets, but this does not mean 
that the savings were achieved through far-reaching im­
provement or modifications in overall agency performance. 
Costs were reduced in many areas, to be sure. But DOA 
was not certain if the savings occurred in the areas indicated 
by agencies in their productivity proposals submitted 
during the budget formulation stage. There was not a 
thorough follow-up to see where the actual productivity 
savings occurred. More importantly, there was no follow-up 
to see how the cuts affected the quantity and quality of 
state services. 
The actions taken by agencies under the rubric of 
"productivity improvement" were not analyzed as to 
impact and long-run costs and benefits. Valuable informa­
tion from this experience, which could have been used to 
shape future management improvements, was simply not 
collected, assessed, or disseminated as far as could be 
determined. 
The statewide productivity program, therefore, was not 
able to move very far beyond the initial supervision of the 
budget cuts. It was basically limited to the attainment of 
dollar savings, without a close review of the nature and 
complexity of agency tasks, the setting of adequate 
performance standards, or the monitoring of agency effec­
tiveness in meeting those standards. As in other states, the 
program budget system has still not replaced the incremen­
tal input-oriented thinking of its users. It is clear that the 
Wisconsin productivity effort was more oriented toward 
securing efficiencies than to promoting a fully productive 
state government. 
A fourth weakness, the lack of supportive services from 
DOA and others, contributed to many of the failings. For 
instance, in tackling the goal of productivity improvement, 
agencies can benefit by sharing ideas and reviewing the 
work of others, especially examples of what has proven 
successful. Yet DOA had no apparent mechanism for such 
coordination and no organized system to transfer successes 
from one state agency to another. The department at­
tempted to prepare a series of reports on this subject, but 
the project was not carried out. 
The absence .of a centralized reporting system meant 
that DOA was not familiar with many projects launched by 
Wisconsin agencies. More than that, it meant that agencies 
lacked information on what their counterparts were doing. 
For example, both the Department of Transportation 
(DOT) and the Department of Health and Social Services 
(HSS) realized savings by punching computer data on discs 
rather than cards. The change occurred first in DOT. If a 
coordinating procedure had been in effect, HSS might have 
adopted the change earlier. Also, the idea might have spread 
to other agencies and thus increased savings to taxpayers. 
In other cases, necessary supportive services were avail­
able but not well integrated into a common strategy. There 
were several statewide efforts related to productivity 
development in Wisconsin state government, as described in 
the earlier section citing examples of productivity programs 
in that state. While these efforts offer a promise of real 
progress, their effectiveness could no doubt be increased if 
they were integrated. Although many aspects of these 
programs are connected, there is presently a dearth of 
officially recognized linkages among them. Agency man­
agers thus are . faced with a plethora of overlapping, 
repetitive demands coming from different institutions, 
using varying terminology, and requiring different paper­
work. 
In still other cases, such as technical assistance and 
training, these supportive services were not available in 
sufficient quantity or quality. Although a~ministrative 
officials stated that technical assistance would be forth­
coming to agencies as they attempted to meet the pro­
ductivity mandate, the actual availability of such assis­
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tance is in question. DOA apparently provided budget 
instructions, a booklet presenting examples of productivity 
improvements from other jurisdictions, and the services of 
a handful of management analysts. But several officials in 
the line agencies reported that technical assistance was 
primarily a paper promise. 
DOA representatives have admitted that the department 
has delivered little technical assistance. The effectiveness of 
the few management analysts available for consultation is 
reduced by the sheer size of state government. There is no 
central policy or provision for management systems experts 
to continually examine priority areas for productivity 
improvement, much less the full range of state activities. 
An important area where adequate assistance was lacking 
is personnel training. Many commentators have noted that 
the key to productivity enhancement lies with day-to-day 
management and performance of activities. To improve 
these elements, a basic requirement is skill development and 
attitudinal change, so that productivity in the broad sense 
becomes a goal of state employees. Training is certainly a 
part of this process. Yet this aspect of productivity was not 
emphasized by DOA, although that Department's Bureau of 
Human Resources is now developing promising programs 
such as the Career Executive Development effort men­
tioned earlier. 
This discussion about the lack of ancillary services is not 
meant to imply that DOA and other central support bodies 
are totally responsible for the failures. DOA has suffered 
from limited resources, the press of other obligations, and 
numerous administrative changes. Compared with large 
businesses in competitive fields, the state has neither the 
authority nor staff to adequately evaluate all of the policies 
and practices affecting productivity. The qualified person­
nel necessary to assist in the improvement of hundreds of 
state services would be sizably larger than anything cur­
rently available. 
Still, some of the services could have been provided 
without substantial new funding, and existing activities 
could have been better coordinated. DOA could have 
contributed more overall guidance and direction. But a 
comprehensive productivity effort would no doubt require 
leadership and support from the governor and legislature 
beyond that provided to date. 
The lack of supportive services leads to a fifth major 
shortcoming, the absence of a central full-time productivity 
office and staff. Wisconsin's productivity effort is decen­
tralized. Although DOA had the official responsibility for 
carrying out the governor's directive, the primary concern 
was with budgetary responsibilities. The staff assigned to 
productivity worked only part-time on this subject. A 
variety of productivity-related functions were spread across 
a number of DOA bureaus, other central administrative 
units, and the various line agencies. The result was 
State Productivity Movement 
confusion about purpose and responsibility and a tendency 
for agencies to avoid interaction. 
A further limitation was the lack of more widespread 
participation in the formulation and development of the 
program. Several agency managers complained that the 
program of mandated budget cuts was presented to them 
without any opportunity for comment or suggestion. (The 
absence of on-going consultation and assistance between 
DOA and the agencies has already been noted.) In addition, 
the program might have benefited from the type of citizens' 
advisory committee that Washington State formed for its 
productivity drive, although lack of public support did not 
seem to be a problem in Wisconsin. A more serious 
drawback was the failure to involve the legislature closely. 
The results of this failure were already demonstrated by the 
productivity reinvestment program example. 
The drawbacks to Wisconsin's productivity effort out­
lined so far represent problems at the statewide level. 
Confusion of purpose, lack of planning, limited perspective, 
absence of supportive services or a central office, and 
limited participation-these are problems that plagued the 
program as it was developed and implemented by central 
administrative and political units. 
It is also appropriate to consider more closely the 
difficulties faced at the ·agency level. Agencies were 
essentially on their own in attempting to meet the 
mandated base budget reductions or adopt systemic 
changes. Innovative attempts at far-reaching reforms have 
arisen in a sporadic and unintegrated manner from some 
agencies which tackled this challenge on their own initiative 
and with their own resources.- A more common reaction 
among · agencies, however, was to view productivity as a 
limited, but troublesome burden. Without centralized sup­
port and direction, many responded by perfunctory 
elimination of some of the "fat" that can be found in most 
programs. In these instances, there was not an examination 
of overall management structure and style, human resource 
development policies, agency objectives, etc. 
In short, the base budget cut could bring true produc­
tivity enhancement, but this depended on the actions taken 
by agency managers. Several factors limited their ability or 
willingness to make such changes. 
First, the across-the-board budgets cuts in both biennia 
were seen by some as arbitrary directives, without con­
sideration of the differing needs and past performances of 
the various state agencies. The hasty preparation of the 
executive mandate, and the absence of a long-range, 
comprehensive approach, were apparent in the undifferen­
tiated instructions sent to all agencies. 
Second, the confusion over what constituted produc­
tivity improvement created some controversy. ·Some agen­
cies, particularly the university system, saw timely capital 
investment as a way to attain long-term productivity by 
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reducing future costs. Certain proposals to this effect were 
apparently not accepted as meeting the official mandate, at 
least in the 1973-1975 biennium. The viewpoint of some 
university spokesmen that higher education was an invest­
ment in long-run future productivity and, thus should be 
treated differently from other state activities, was also not 
accepted. 
This confusion over definitions and objectives is illus­
trated by the responses .of agencies to the mandated 
productivity improvements. Some of the productivity 
proposals submitted by agencies were disallowed or criti­
cized as not being "true . productivity" savings. The 
Department of Administration rejected some productivity 
claims, for instance, that were considered to entail reduc­
tions in services. 
Declining workload demands and concomitant reduced 
costs were also claimed as productivity savings by some 
agencies. The rationale was that enhanced agency perfor­
mance caused the reduction. In some cases DOA rejected 
the claims, but in others the savings were approved. This 
practice appears to be questionable, given the difficulty of 
establishing the relative influence of better institutional 
care or more effective agency actions as opposed to other 
social variables in contributing to the reduction. 
Examples of these dubious savings include the Depart­
ment of Health and Social Services, which claimed a $3.7 
million lowering of costs for institutional care as a 
productivity gain. The major cost savings was for food, 
since institutional population was declining. The savings 
apparently resulted from fewer clients rather than improved 
productivity. The Department of Transportation previously 
employed an engineer who spent part of his time seeking 
federal grants for the construction of sewage facilities. As 
the rate of sewage plant construction decreased, due to an 
adequate supply of such facilities, the position was 
dropped. The savings were claimed as productivity. Iri. the 
same department, money had been appropriated for some 
time for a management training program. With a tightening 
job market, high quality personnel were t;nore readily 
available, and the need for the trainee program was 
reduced. The elimination of the program was also claimed 
as a productivity savings. 
Third, some agencies complained that the requirements 
to submit productivity proposals, coupled with other 
budgetary information, created an excess of complex 
paperwork, much of which would not be used. A major 
problem, especially in the beginning, was the separation of 
valuable forms from irrelevant paperwork. 
Fourth, several factors led agency people to question the 
g~od faith of the productivity effort. These include the 
contrast between the rhetorical emphasis on a comprehen­
sive productivity campaign and the actual situation which 
has been depicted, resentment about the ultimate fate of 
the promised reinvestment monies, and the heavily pub­
licized budget increases for gubernatorial and legislative 
staffs. 
One official described the productivity effort as a 
two-track approach: sweeping rhetoric about systemic 
changes coupled with the reality of reiatively small savings 
at the margin. Legislators in particular were seen as looking 
for an image of prudent public officials, while not 
delivering on their pledges. This overselling of the program 
created negative attitudes at the agency level, and tended to 
poison the understanding and trust necessary for real 
changes. Consequently, "productivity" has negative con­
notations for many. 
Fifth, these factors meant that there was a lack of 
compelling motivation for administrators and employees to 
examine agency productivity in depth. Both positive and 
negative incentives are needed to overcome the commit­
ment to existing operations and the growth mentality 
pervasive in state government. But there are at present no 
effective rewards for agency efforts to produce at the same 
level but with lower costs. The productivity reinvestment 
plan and other employee incentive mechanisms have not 
been very successful. In fact, the official who diligently cuts 
costs might find himself penalized with a pattern of lower 
appropriations while · his more wasteful counterparts con­
tinue to receive excessive funding. 
This discussion of the weaknesses of Wisconsin's produc­
tivity program should be concluded with a review of several 
problems in the political environment of Wisconsin state 
government with which any such program would be faced. 
The problems here are perhaps less susceptible to resolution 
than the problems already noted. 
First, the governor, legislature, and DOA are unable to 
exercise firm control over some state expenditures. In 
Wisconsin, only five of the state's major departments are 
headed by persons appointed by and responsible to the 
governor. Boards or commissions govern many state 
agencies, creating somewhat · independent spheres of 
influence. As mentioned earlier, these independent depart­
ments made only average efforts to achieve productivity 
savings. Governor Lucey has promoted a move to a cabinet 
system of direct executive leadership and unless such a 
system is adopted, the prospects for a vigorous statewide 
productivity campaign will be hampered. 
More importantly, the productivity effort to date has of 
necessity been limited to state operations only, although 
these activities account for less than one-third of the total 
state budget. The remainder is comprised of state aid to 
individuals and local governments through shared taxes. 
Although there are apparently no legal restrictions on 
enforcing productivity standards on such local units, the 
political and administrative burdens would be high. 
The effects of this limitation can be seen in two areas of 
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state government. First, the budget of the Department of 
Health and Social Services (HSS) goes in large part to 
individuals and local governments. (The major programs are 
Ai<J for Dependent Children, mental health, social services, 
and medical assistance.) To achieve the mandated budget 
cuts, the department was forced to concentrate on . the 
smaller part of its funding that went to state institutions. 
Second, the University of Wisconsin System was held 
responsible for meeting the budget cuts, with resulting 
controversies. However, another statewide education effort, 
the vocational-technical system, is operated by local govern­
ments (although with state aid), and was thus not respon­
sible for meeting the demands of the governor's program. 
This situation troubled university officials and other ob­
servers. 
The governor and other state officials have attempted to 
increase the presently minimal supervision over state funds 
going to local governments and individuals. Governor Lucey 
has been committed to property tax limits to restrain 
spending by local governments and school districts, with 
the result that the statewide average mill rate declined in 
1975. The legislature provided a "sum certain" expenditure 
ceiling on 197 5-1977 funding for social services programs, 
rather than the previous "sum sufficient" approach, when 
eligible services were funded whatever thefr cost. The 
legislature also made HSS responsible for allocating such 
services on a contractual basis. Another statutory change 
was the requirement of uniform standards for purchases by 
social services and mental health units using state funds. 
The welfare assistance program has also been subject to 
new billing checks. This federally mandated expansion of 
quality control specifies performance targets and tolerance 
levels, and uses statistical samples to ascertain mistakes. In 
addition, a small number of HSS employees will have 
full-time responsibility for advising county welfare depart­
ments on productivity-related management concerns. 
Another change affecting the AFDC program will be the 
use of flat rates rather than grants for the delivery of 
services. It is hoped that this change will simplify adminis­
tration and reduce errors regarding ineligibility and 
incorrect payments. 
There have been several new cost controls on the state's 
target social program, medical assistance. Governor Lucey 
in 1974 imposed a freeze on the price the state would pay 
for prescription drugs, physicians' services, and other 
benefits, although not on nursing home care. In his 1976 
budget message he requested that 10 new positions be 
approved in HSS to better control the medical assistance 
program and strengthen the independent medical review 
program for nursing homes. This new unit would attempt 
to conduct additional utilization reviews, identify fraud, 
and systematically determine areas for productivity savings. 
Other changes in this field include the development of a 
new computerized Medicaid Management lnfonhation 
System, the proposed substitution of generic for brand­
name drugs, and legislative proposals to require certificates 
of need and mandatory prospective rate-setting for hos­
pitals. 
These cost control and program supervision measures 
indicate that the governor, legislature, and other state 
leaders are concerned about their lack of control over 
substantial amounts of state monies. They realize that the 
state must improve the productivity of local governments 
before it can reach its overall goal. 
A second major constraint is imposed by civil service 
restrictions. These statutory and contractual restrictions 
decrease the flexibility of administrators to shape personnel 
policies in a manner consistent with productivity improve­
ment, according to a number of agency officials to whom 
we talked. 
For instance, managers used to possess some discretion 
in selecting employees to be laid off. Under the new 
collective bargaining contracts, layoffs are based entirely on 
seniority. It is felt that layoffs under the new process could 
be seriously hannful, depriving agencies of the skills and 
energies of younger workers. 
Also, managers have lost much of their ability to reward 
productive employees with merit increases in salaries. 
Employee unions want increases based on a broad, flat 
schedule. As a result, only a miniscule portion of salary 
monies are presently available for merit increases. Since 
personnel costs are the largest single state expenditure, 





AN OPERATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 
"Productivity improvement" is becoming a popular 
catchword for many officials in an age of growing doubts 
about the financing and performance of state government. 
A heavily publicized campaign to enhance productivity 
seems to be a natural response to some of the pressures on 
state government referred to earlier. But there are some 
important elements that need to be considered before this 
general concern can be transformed into a successful 
program. 
CONCEPTUAL AND POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
This section examines the major conceptual and political 
Issues which need to be considered in the initial establish- · 
ment of a productivity enhancement effort. The conceptual 
issues include clarity of definitions and objectives; the value 
of a long-term, comprehensive approach; choice of initial 
targets; and the importance of careful planning. 
Perhaps the overriding need is for a clear set of 
definitions, goals, and objectives to be devised and com­
municated to all of those involved in the program. As 
discussed in Chapter I, "productivity" implies different 
things to different people. Therefore, this term (or what­
ever phrase is used to describe the overall program) must be 
precisely clarified in light of the · particular context. We 
recommend against an extremely narrow and confining 
definition, and instead urge consideration of a broad 
concept of productivity entailing a concern for the ef- . 
ficiency, effectiveness, and quality of public services 
(Newland, 1975). If such a perspective is used, however, it 
must be explicitly stated so that there is no confusion or 
misunderstanding. The Wisconsin case study presented 
earlier demonstrates this point. 
Likewise, the goals and objectives of the program must 
be defined, and this requires careful scrutiny of the needs 
and capabilities of state government and of the possibilities 
and limitations encompassed in the notion of productivity 
improvement. The purpose of the effort must be clearly 
stated, realistic, and relevant to these concerns. 
Goals should be tempered by the knowledge that 
productivity is not a precise, short-term remedy for fiscal 
crunches, nor a panacea for all that ails state government. 
Rather than a "quick fix" that can rectify problems of an 
inadequate tax base or inept administration, productivity 
improvement is a long-term task that requires continuing 
attention. It is not a trendy technique nor a one­
dimensional innovation, but is multi-dimensional and 
promises to pay off over time {Committee for Economic 
Development [hereinafter referred to as CED] , 197 6; 
NYSSTF, 197 5). 
A productivity program should not be oversold in its 
initial stages, for exaggerated promises may result in later 
frustration and even the abandonment of the effort. Many 
agencies in Wisconsin, for example, believed that more was 
implied in the announcement of that state's program than 
was actually delivered. This feeling in some cases created 
negative attitudes toward the endeavor. 
This is not to say that governments cannot attain savings 
in response to immediate financial crises. But such savings 
are not really an improvement in "productivity" unless 
they are achieved through a favorable modification in the 
ratio of resources used to produce the same level of 
successful results. This implies a type of managerial 
analysis, well-conceived innovations, and focus on quality 
not ordinarily found in hasty budget cuts or personnel 
layoffs. Also, governments need not wait until the advent 
of pressing crises to secure the benefits of enhanced 
productivity. The goals of a productivity enhancement 
program should be directed at securing improvements over 
an extended period of time, rather than the one-shot effort 
typified by "Little Hoover" Commissions or crash austerity 
programs. The changes in processes and attitudes that a 
longer-range program can deliver will contribute more to 
the viability of government than a whirlwind of reform that 
is soon forgotten. 
Similarly, the program should concentrate, to the extent 
feasible, on a comprehensive examination of state govern­
ment operations rather than one or a few topics that are of 
current interest. The components of a productivity im­
provement program cover a wide range and the elements 
involved in productivity are many. "Putting all of your eggs 
in one basket" may not only ignore crucial are~s deserving 
attention, but may be politically dangerous if the results of 
this concentration are disappointing or threatening to 
powerful interests. 
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Of course, the resources and energies available to the 
effort will not be unlimited. Therefore, long-range and 
comprehensive goals must be brought into focus especially 
in the beginning stages by more limited objectives with 
specified dates of attainment. The scope of the program's 
initial activities must be ·determined and priorities selected. 
The publication So, Mr. Mayor, You Want To Improve 
Productivity, recommends that improvement programs 
begin with specific problems in certain areas of operation, 
and lists several useful criteria for choosing such areas 
(National Commission on Productivity [hereafter referred 
to as NCOP], 1974). Above all, it is important to choose 
initial areas where program success can be demonstrated. 
The productivity effort will more readily gain the support 
of influential political forces if savings and improvements 
can be shown in the period after implementation begins. 
This was a major plus for Wisconsin's program, because $33 
million was saved in the first two years. However, the State 
of Washington, another leader in the state productivity 
movement, is beginning to see legislative interest wane due 
to the lack of early demonstrable results. 
Attention to the initial limited objectives should not 
obscure the overall goal of a comprehensive effort to 
augment the performance of state government. Early 
favorable results in meeting objectives may provide a base 
for the establishment ·of the long-range c.ampaign. For 
instance, a few carefully selected pilot projects c~ be used . 
to demonstrate achievements, · test program models, and 
remove misapprehensions. If the necessary political leader­
ship is also present, successful initial experiences can lead to 
an expanded effort and a fuller commitment. . , 
The Wisconsin effort did not entail systematic analysis 
prior to implementation to insure that the resulting efforts 
were well-conceived, clearly articulated, or widely accepted . . 
State agencies were cognizant ·of the hurried and somewhat 
arbitrary nature of the program, and tended to react with 
hostility. 
Planning can be a useful exercise in reviewing state 
,needs, determining appropriate goals and objectives, clari­
fying the requisite operational elements of a program, 
combining concept and structure, and thus providing the 
groundwork for a successful program. The· sophistication 
and duration of the initial planning stage will vary, of 
course, depending upon the political environment and 
analytical capabilities of each state. But it should be 
remembered that. substantial productivity improvement 
takes time to plan, test, and accomplish. 
In addition to developing a sound conceptual base, the 
productivity effort must elicit political support to get off 
\ 
the ground. Visible, high-level commitment is critical, for, 
as Balk (197Sd) has noted, the actions and perceived 
interests of policy makers are central fact.ors in motivating 
employees, creating environmental pressures for change, 
and establishing modes and incentives for productivity 
improvement . . In Wisconsin the initiative and continued 
support of the governor was the key force behind the 
program. · 
This commitment must be backed by a willingness to 
invest the time and resources needed for a serious cam­
paign. Agency personnel will be aware of the difference 
between glib rhetorical promises and a firm resolve to 
improve the operations of state government. The former is 
limited to press releases, general resolutions, and vague 
directives; the latter is characterized by specific objectives, 
clear assignment of responsibilities and deadlines, the 
availability of an administration infrastructure and sup­
portive services, and an effective 'system of rewards and 
penalties. 
Another aspect of.leadership commitment is the willing- . 
ness to accept and implement needed changes. The initia­
tion of a productivity program will be a meaningless gesture 
unless state officials are serious about utilizing the knowl­
edge obtained to change programs and modes of delivery 
and to shift resources to the most compelling needs. 
Commitment is needed from others besides top state 
officials . . The State Government Productivity Research 
Project at the State University of New York at Albany has_ 
devoted considerable attention to the environmental factors 
in state government which are important to the efficacy of 
improvement. programs. This group has noted that long­
term advances depend upon more than good agency 
management techniques and bureaucratic will power. The 
program must be supported by the overall institutional 
fabric of. state government. The major influences upon 
agencies include other agencies, the governor's office, the 
legislature, employee organizations, civil service bureaus, 
agency constituencies, the media, federal agencies, and the 
public at large (Balk, 197Sa and b). Without reviewing in 
detail the roles of these groups, several points should be 
made. 
. First, the formulation of the productivity effort should 
include broad-based input from affected parties in state 
government. This can be accomplished through advisory 
committees, hearings, informal meetings, the circulation of . 
preliminary policy statements, and a variety of other 
means. 
Two groups within state government in particular merit 
special attention. State employees, those who will ulti­
mately be responsible for enhancing productivity, must 
accept and understand the program, or it is doomed to 
failure. Middie--level managers and first-line supervisors, who 
are often closely tied to rank and file employees, must be 
oriented and reassured as to program goals and operations. 
Their ideas, and those of employees gener.ally, will be 
valuable in devising a statewide program and will be 
essential in implementing it at the agency level. Also, the 
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legislature should be involved in the formulation and 
evaluation of the program. An example of what can happen 
when it is not involved was presented in the incident 
concerning the productivity reinvestment program in the 
Wisconsin case study. 
Second, a public constituency for productivity must be 
courted or, perhaps, created. Fosler (1975) has noted that 
at present the advocates of productivity improvement are a 
weak interest in the political arena and that the main 
impediment to such improvement is the lack of incentives 
in the political system for dealing with such issues. 
The political forces which are potential obstacles to an 
improvement program, on the other hand, wield substantial 
power. State government politics is often oriented to the 
awarding of various types of benefits. State workers seek 
pay increases, communities and interest groups seek state 
assistance for programs, and· . agencies try to receive in­
creased budgets. These groups may have strong support for 
their goals~goals which may not be consistent with those 
of the productivity program. 
Obviously, everyone who fits in one of these categories 
is not selfish and opposed to "progress" or the "public 
interest." But a productivity effort, with its careful analysis 
of existing programs and resource allocations, will un­
doubtedly face opposition from some vested interests. 
Since politics provides the principal force for change in 
state government, the productivity-related issues need to 
counter opposition and/or apathy by demonstrating broad 
political appeal-that is, proven success in achieving produc­
tivity should be able to command campaign funds and votes. 
To reach this end, Fosler (1975) urges a political strategy 
. which includes a more intense and continuous appeal to 
and mobilization of traditionally supportive groups and the 
enlistment of new groups. 
Such groups could include public interest and govern­
ment reform organizations, business associations, political 
parties, universities and research centers, and others. To 
. reach them, productivity must be defined in terms relevant 
to their interests. Perhaps the program could solicit 
voluntary assistance, such as the lending of managerial 
talent. 
To better tap potential support from the general public, 
publicity should be given to the program's goals, com­
ponents and, especially, to any successes. The average 
citizen will not respond to the word "productivity" or to 
esoteric administrative reforms, but will be interested in tax 
issues, the delivery of services, and the perceived overall 
performance of state government. The improvement pro­
gram can also serve as a vehicle for providing information 
about state government to the public. 
Third, the attention of the public and all of the affected 
parties needs to be focused on issues broader than the 
particular improvement program underway. Systematic 
productivity gains will be more likely in jurisdictions which 
have an institutionalized commitment to good management 
and to good government (Bell, 1975). This is a somewhat 
intangible factor, subject to the history and political culture 
of the state as well as many socioeconomic variables. But 
such commitment can and should be nurtured, for it 
provides a breeding ground for a more permanent concern 
for productivity enhancement. 
STRUCTURAL CONSIDERATIONS 
This section deals with five issues: (1) which organiza­
tional locations in government can best provide overall 
policy direction for the productivity program; (2) discre­
tion versus control; (3) the relationships among agencies 
in the productivity program; (4) reorganization of the 
structure of state government; and (5) intergovernmental 
aspects of productivity enhancement. 
First, the respective roles of the executive and legislative 
branches in developing and implementing a productivity 
improvement program should be considered. In all of the 
states with a recognized program in this field, the impetus 
has come from the governor, and the legislative contribu­
tion has been secondary or negligible. This situation arises, 
no doubt, from the traditional administrative responsibili­
ties of the chief executive arid the state legislature's 
preference for concrete problem-solving rather than analysis 
of general management needs. Yet, as Crane (1975) points 
out in his paper on the limitations and strengths of 
legislatures in this area, productivity program leadership 
does not have to come from the executive. Legislatures 
have greatly enhanced their institutional capacity to deal 
with productivity issues in recent years. He notes the 
potential· for legislative action in stimulating productivity 
programs "in states such· as Texas, where the legislature 
dominates policy making and budget formulation. 
Although leadership in productivity will likely be found 
in the executive branch in most states, legislatures can have 
an impact by the adoption of supportive statutes and 
resolutions, the provision of necessary resources for the 
conduct of enhancement programs, and, particularly, the · 
exercise of effective oversight. Through the growing use of 
performance post~audits and program evaluation, and the 
capacity to link these reviews to budget decisions, legisla­
tive bodies can hold managers accountable for productivity. 
In fact, without legislative support, it is unlikely that a 
productivity program will survive. 
A second structural issue is the extent to which the 
productivity effort is centralized. There is a need for some 
central control to establish program limits and priorities 
which correspond to the resources available and the elected 
officials' view of the public interest (NYSTF, 197 5). Also, 
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assistance and encouragement will have to be provided from 
a statewide locus-given that many agencies will lack the 
necessary skills, have responsibilities that already tax their 
resources, and will be hostile to threats to the status quo. 
At the same time, sufficient flexibility must be allowed for 
agency managers to achieve results and display initiative 
since the people in the agencies will be most knowledgeabl; 
about present operations. 
A tight line must be walked between unresponsive 
autonomy and stifling overregulation. The National Com­
mission on Productivity (1974) made recommendations in 
this regard.. In organizing a productivity improvement 
program, it urges chief executives not to delegate totally 
the operation of the program to existing staff organizations 
but to keep central direction close to the top. Talent should 
be provided on a full-time basis to run the effort. These 
experts would work with the agencies to assign coor­
dinators to each improvement project, to develop work 
plans with specific objectives for each project, to regularly 
monitor and provide status reports, to resolve problems and 
examine trouble areas, and finally to evaluate the results. 
At the same time, technical assistance would be provided to 
the agencies to help enable them to meet productivity 
targets. 
Under this type of arrangement, managers could still 
manage. Their scope for action and creativity need not be 
overly restricted with centrally imposed techniques that 
might not be appropriate in their agency's setting. Instead, 
they should be held accountable for results and provided 
with the assistance needed to achieve results. But the 
ultimate fate of the projects would depend on the 
individual coordinator's judgement and talent, as well as 
that of the other agency employees. The role of the central 
staff vis-a-vis the agencies should be one of encouragement, 
assistance, reporting, plus serving as a visible reminder of 
the executive commitment to the project. 
A central productivity office on a statewide level is an 
important element of a successful campaign. (The lack of 
such an office in Wisconsin was a serious drawback to that 
effort.) Such an office could serve many functions, includ­
ing: 
providing policy direction and clarity of purpose; 
planning for comprehensive and long-range ap­
proaches; 
collecting and disseminating information and ideas; 
monitoring progress, identifying successes and 
failures, analyzing results; 
supplying management consulting and other suppor­
tive services, or referring agencies to appropriate 
locations to obtain them; 
conducting special training or workshops; 
coordinating related activities; 
developing incentive programs; and 
acting as a liaison with efforts nationally and in other 
states. 
A third consideration is the coordination of agency 
productivity projects. While the particular circumstances 
relevant to improvement vary from agency to agency, some 
innovations may be transferable. Changes in management 
systems, work techniques, and personnel policies, ,plus 
certain capital investments, may prove to have applicability 
outside of the agency in which they were originally 
introduced. In addition, managers and project directors can 
benefit from the experiences of others, i.e., from the 
difficulties and successes that their ,counterparts have faced. 
For these reasons, some type of coordination and· 
innovation transfer mechanism should be established. The 
focus of such a mechanism does not have to be limited to 
topics directly linked to the identified productivity pro­
gram. Other development projects which are related to 
productivity improvement, but perhaps not explicitly made 
a part of an official program (such as agency Management 
by Objective experiments), can also benefit from a pooling 
of ideas. As Porter {1975) has pointed out, productivity can 
bring together diverse groups {industrial engineers, budget 
analysts, management experts, personnel officials) and thus 
integrate many related concerns. 
Fourth, statewide productivity efforts should include a 
review of the state program structure, where applicable. 
The more efficient and effective provision of public services 
can often be strengthened through a reorganization and 
rationalization of state departments and agencies. A num­
ber of states have effected real economies and improved 
their operations through a thorough study and revision of 
outmoded organizational structures. 
A fifth set of issues relates to intergovernmental aspects 
of productivity enhancement. Chapter I described federal 
programs which make financial and technical assistance in 
this field available to state and local governments or which 
serve research and clearinghouse functions. These sources 
have greatly expanded in recent years. 
However, the federal role in assisting state government 
productivity efforts could be further enhanced. The recent 
report of the Committee for Economic Development 
{1976) offers some recommendations, including a redesign 
of federal grant programs; more attention by the national 
government to general management improvement and 
personnel policies; and increased research and development 
assistance, particularly in the use of science and technology 
at the state and local level. In addition to direct produc­
tivity enhancement aid, federal agencies exert influence 
over state operations in their functional areas through 
funding, regulation, and reporting requirements. The effect 
of these mechanisms on productivity deserves further 
study. 
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As noted earlier, a number of states have adopted 
productivity improvement drives in recent years. Coopera­
tion among these various efforts would serve to further 
develop the "state of the art" and provide greater recogni­
tion to the national interest in this subject. Such 
cooperation has occurred to some extent in the form of 
workshop presentations and informal contacts. A clearing­
house on state government productivity, which has been 
proposed on several different occasions (see Balk, l 975b ), 
would further this interchange of ideas. The various 
national professional and program area associations to 
which state managers belong could devote some of their 
energies to this subject, especially to developing comparable 
measures of common activities. 
Finally, state governments are going to be increasingly 
concerned about the productivity of their local govern­
ments, as more state funds are transferred to this level. The 
Wisconsin case study illustrated some of the problems 
involved and approaches that can be taken in tackling this 
issue. The Committee for Economic Development (1976) 
has proposed several actions that states can adopt, including 
the enforcement of accounting and budgeting standards, 
the institution of structural changes, provision of manage­
ment and training assistance, and the establishment of 
official bodies to examine productivity on a statewide basis. 
COMPONENTS OF A PRODUCTNITY 
PROGRAM 
Location of Program Direction. As implied earlier, a 
central office will need to possess the necessary skills and 
analytical tools to operate a program and to assist in the 
exploration of the various components of productivity 
improvement. More than that, the central office should 
hav sufficient authority to insure compliance with program 
goals and objectives. 
Both Washington and Wisconsin have provided this 
power by connecting their programs to the budget process. 
Resource allocation through this process has increasingly 
emphasized cost-benefit and similar analyses, as reflected in 
the use of program/performance budgets, zero based 
budgets, and management by objectives. Since budgets are 
major control mechanisms in government, tying agency 
performance to appropriations through the reporting and 
review of appropriate measures is a way to obtain leverage 
for good management and productivity. The link to the 
budget prevents agencies from ignoring or downgrading the 
productivity effort. Moreover, the emphasis on account­
ability for verifiable results will be more fruitful than a 
forcing of generalized solutions on all state operations. 
But several difficulties exist in this approach. First, 
budget systems are not inherently designed or applied to 
foster a concern for efficiency and effectiveness. Tradi­
tional decision-making patterns; regardless of budgetary 
formats, tend to focus on agency competition for funds and 
incremental changes. Expanded use of the budget as a 
means of promoting productivity will necessitate a shift in 
emphasis to programmatic concerns, the budget execution 
phase, legislative oversight, and perhaps a quarterly allot­
ment cycle on the basis of agency performance (NYSSTF, 
1975). 
Second, associating the productivity program too 
closely with budget controls may engender resentment and 
result in the reporting of misleading aggregate data by the 
agencies. The many components of productivity improve­
ment may be ignored as managers devote attention to 
preparation of self-serving reports-. So, use of budgetary 
controls must be supplemented with other mechanisms. 
The areas where agencies can find and implement 
desirable changes are many. Various authors have presented 
lists of the elements or causal factors in productivity 
improvement (see the writings of Walter Balk, as well as G. 
M. Betal, 1973;JFMIP, 1974; NYSSTF, 1975). It should be 
obvious that different methods and techniques will be 
found to have differing validity in different states or 
agencies. But a _broad breakdown of the components of a 
comprehensive program should include the following 
topics: (1) capital investments; (2) service delivery mech­
anisms; (3) management improvement; and (4) human 
resources. (Two overall factors which affect the success of a 
program, measurement systems and motivation, are of such 
overriding importance that separate sections of this .chapter 
are devoted to them.) 
Capital Investments. New and improved capital goods~ 
and the research, development, education, and training 
required to create and use them-are estimated by leading 
economists to have contributed 40 to 60 percent of the 
productivity increases in the private sector (OMB, et al, 
1973). 
The most frequently cited causes of productivity 
changes in the Federal Government are process factors~ 
particularly capital investment and new technology (JFMIP, 
1974). New equipment is the most effective way to increase 
productivity for large groups of people employed on a 
stable basis (GAO, 1975). Quantum leaps in productivity 
are generally due to technological innovations (NYSSTF, 
1975). 
Because improved technology and the availability of 
capital per worker have been major sources of productivity 
growth in the private sector, the federal program has paid 
special attention to capital investment. Yet there is some 
doubt as to whether this priority is warranted at the state 
level, which is generally more service-oriented and labor­
intensive. Hopes for major advances at this level, therefore, 
should not necessarily be placed on the substitution of 
capital equipment for workers (CED, 1976). State govern­
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ments can, however, augment their performance to some 
extent through better use of equipment, facilities, and 
technology. The case study in this report provided examples 
of such improvements. 
Several authors have suggested that public agencies 
should more carefully identify their needs in this area, in 
some cases through a central staff which would ascertain 
productive investments on a continuing basis. Agencies 
should be informed about new · and existing technological 
developments and the use of capital improvements to 
perform similar tasks in other agencies and other jurisdic­
tions, e.g., the possibilities for technology transfer. They 
should provide greater visibility for productivity-enhancing 
investments and improve the credibility of their investment 
programs through better justifications and feedback of 
information on previous investments. 
Also, financing policies should be reviewed. Capital 
investments often lose out in budgetary consideration 
because of their high initial costs, the ease of deferral, and 
more pressing operation and maintenance requests. Invest­
ments which promise a favorable rate of return and an 
increase in productivity might fare better if they were 
separately identified in budget submissions. Such financing 
techniques as leases, lease-purchases, capital budgets, and 
revolving funds should be examined (OMB, et al., 1973). 
Service Delivery Mechanisms. This is a broad area in 
which •states can realize productivity gains if they are 
willing to experiment with different mechanisms which 
provide alternatives to present practices. Governments need 
to develop the capacity to change modes of delivery if 
existing ones are not as efficient or effective as they should 
be. 
Fosler (1975) has written of the desirability of more 
direct connections between government service organiza­
tions and the people they serve. He sees two new 
approaches to this end. First, the consumer movement can 
be enhanced (insofar as it is concerned with the public 
sector) through increased feedback such as client satis­
faction questionnaires, decentralization of administrative 
services and political decision making, increased accessi­
bility to government, and greater citizen awareness. Second, 
citizens can be given greater choice in the production and 
delivery of public services through competition among 
agencies and with the private sector, and through con­
tracting for services with other organizations. Competition 
among agencies is illustrated by the city of Boston's use of 
rehabilitation rebates and code enforcement. The two 
programs are operated by separate departments to achieve 
the same goal of meeting adequate housing standards for 
existing dwellings. Competition from the private sector can 
be encouraged, for instance, through the public provision of 
vouchers for services. Contracting can involve either the 
private sector or other governmental bodies, as with the 
Lakewood Plan where many municipal services are provided 
to smaller communities on a fee basis by Los Angeles 
County. 
Other examples of ways to improve service delivery 
include the relocation of offices or the sharing of equip­
ment and facilities to achieve economies of scale, and better 
allocation of employee time to meet patterns of demand. 
By examining the demand for services and controlling the 
staffing schedules, crew sizes, and work schedules of a:n 
agency, a better mix between service requirements and 
public resources can be obtained. In doing this, however, 
managers should determine that the altered workload or 
caseload ratios do not adversely affect the quality of service 
provision. 
Management Improvement. A commitment to "good 
management" and the presence of the attitudes and devices 
which the phrase connotes are crucial factors in improving 
the performance of state government. Although dozens of 
volumes have been written on this subject, several brief 
comments should be made about the role of management 
improvement in a productivity program. 
The skills of agency managers are critical to a pro­
ductivity program. Particularly important is the capacity 
for systematic analysis of agency operations (both current 
methods and alternatives) in light of objectives, costs, and 
benefits. Yet most states appear to be ill-equipped in 
analytic capacity. The Committee for Economic Develop­
ment (1976) found chronic deficiencies in line agency 
management, especially in terms of a lack of training and 
ability. 
The state of Wisconsin has taken a special interest in 
rectifying this situation. The case study in this report 
described that state's Career Executive Program and Execu­
tive Assessment Center. Wisconsin has also experimented 
with the use of professional consultants to recruit top 
managers, with personnel interchange between other levels 
of government and the private sector, and with revisions in 
several personnel policies to facilitate more rapid entry and 
exit from state employment and thus increase the infusion 
of new blood into the managerial ranks. These changes are 
directed at the acquisition of talented executives, new 
advancement opportunities for managers, and more flex­
ibility for supervisors in recruiting and assigning personnel 
(Lucey, 1975a and 1975b). 
These types of executive development programs offer a 
prime route to improve productivity. States should consider 
innovative ways to develop managerial skills and match 
those skills with the different agency needs, through 
expanded training programs and the establishment of a 
managerial corps (NYSTF, 1975). 
The proper atmosphere for the exercise of management 
skills must also be present. Several authors have commented 
on impediments to productivity from the mindlessly tight 
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controls imposed on managers by restrictive laws, pro­
cedures, and regulations. These often result in insular, 
self-protective bureaucracies where there are no rewards for 
risk-taking. The useful exercise of judgement emerges over 
time only after sufficient authority has been delegated and 
flexibility provided for managers to employ that judgement. 
Productive management requires that some decision-making 
responsibilities be placed on middle and lower-level mana­
gers (Bell, 1975). 
One factor consistently mentioned in the literature and 
by agency managers as a prime obstacle to productivity 
improvement is current civil service laws and regulations. 
The case study in this report also reflects a concern for this 
problem. Examples of the cumbersome restrictions on 
management discretion imposed by these rules include 
limited discipline and discharge powers, uniform pay and 
promotion schemes, job tenure and seniority rules, and 
hiring provisions (Lentz, 1975). The effect.of such rules on 
managerial flexibility and control, and hence on efficient 
and effective operations, should be reviewed and balanced 
against other values secured by such practices (i.e., equity, 
security, and nonpartisanship ). 
An important element of good management which is 
intimately related to productivity is the setting of and 
adhering to objectives for state programs. Performance 
evaluation requires a yardstick for comparison of results to 
intentions. Although goals should be a product of delibera­
tion among elected officials, managers will be involved in 
. turning these goals into operational objectives. It is impor­
tant to make presently general or intangible goals more 
specific and measurable. These objectives will have to be 
clearly assigned to organizational units and personnel 
wid:tin those units, and placed within discrete time periods. 
Ordione (1974) and others have noted that an emphasis 
upon methods and skills often leads to a shift of managers' 
attention from the aims of their organization to the 
behavior required by the rules and practices of the past. 
This process of "goals displacement," in which formal 
adherence to bureaucratic procedures becomes a terminal 
rather than instrumental value, merits concern in any 
management improvement effort. 
A final subject to be touched upon is the relationship 
between managers and program specialists. Where profes­
sionalization of agency personnel has blocked the develop­
ment of a management ethic through the tunnel vision of 
particular programmatic loyalties, reform may be necessary. 
In such cases, either those with general managerial skills 
must supplement or replace the specialists, or the specialists 
must become good managers (NYSSTF, 1975). 
\ 
Human Resources. The role of state government-
employee relations in productivity improvement has been 
the subject of much discussion and controversy. Although 
personnel costs are generally the largest category in state 
budgets, Lentz (1975) and others have claimed that too 
much emphasis is usually placed on this area as a source of 
dollar savings. Lentz points out that employee compensa­
tion accounts for only 20 percent of the total expenditures 
of state governments, although the percentage is much 
larger for their annual operating budgets. 
Furthermore, it has been claimed that a long-run 
productivity program which merely seeks to halt the rapid 
growth · of state payrolls will be a "dead letter" as long as 
many people turn to government for needs not met in the 
private sector. The increasing political clout of organized 
government employees is a major factor in many jurisdic­
tions. Cutting the government work force is adniittedly 
different because of political pressures. It has been argued 
that productivity efforts will have to accept a growing 
public labor force as a constraint on their scope of action 
(Adams, 1975). 
Still, state governments cannot neglect the critical area 
of human resource management. An analysis of ways to 
improve the management of human resources should be an 
essential component of productivity programs, as long as it 
is remembered that the goal of such programs is to increase 
productivity, and_ not necessarily to reduce the work force 
(NCOP, 1974). 
The effect of productivity job cutbacks or employment 
ceilings is also a controversial topic. An account of the New 
York State experience (Sperry, 197 5) cites such cutbacks as 
a way to increase pressure on management and employees 
to u8e resources efficiently, and lists a number of ways in 
which the ·reductions led to increased productivity. A 
report of the federal productivity project (OMB, et al., 
1973), however, contends that personnel ceilings have 
major adverse effects on efficient management, and that 
across-the-board cuts and freezes are especially counter­
productive. 
It should be noted that alternatives to personnel cuts are 
available. Retraining, reassignment, and attrition can often 
be used to achieve the desired ends. Also, as a practical 
matter, the National Commission on Productivity (1974) 
found that productivity improvement programs rarely 
result in layoffs. 
Common stereotypes reflected in public opinion polls · 
and everyday conversations depict government workers as 
lazy clock-watchers. There may consequently be some 
pressures to focus on forcing state employees to "work 
harder." But a productivity program aimed primarily at the 
issue of employee diligence would be wrong on both 
political and management grounds. Diligence is a problem 
that should be addressed, but not on a government-wide 
basis (NYSTF, 1975). Wisconsin's slogan, "Work Smarter, 
Not Harder," seems especially appropriate. 
An alternative approach is to review the work environ­
ment. Numerous commentators have noted the problem of 
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boredom in routine desk jobs and the presence of indif­
ferent or frustrated employees. Part of this situation may 
derive from underemployment of employees or misalloca­
tion of skills. Such approaches as employee attitude and 
utilization surveys, review of job classification systems, 
manpower planning and forecasting, expanded participation 
by workers in objective-setting, greater delegation of 
authority and responsibility, and new incentive and sug­
gestion procedures might be helpful. A concern for the 
"quality of work life" is a popular way of framing some of 
these approaches and might strike a more responsive chord 
than the use of the term "productivity." 
Training geared to specific organizational and juris­
dictional needs is another means of securing the skills and 
attitudes required for the effective utilization of human 
resources (Shallman, 1975). Wise and McGregor (1975) 
have noted that a sizable training effort is necessary for a 
successful productivity improvement program, and that 
such training includes an entire curriculum, not a single 
prepackaged course. The Federal Government has devel­
oped a number of training programs related to productivity 
enhancement, and some states offer centralized training 
programs that can be of value in this regard. 
Three concluding comments seem appropriate. First, for 
any of these approaches or techniques to be effective over a 
long period of time, they must be made an organic part of 
the management processes of agencies and state government 
generally. Second, linkages in these processes-between 
policy decision-making, budgeting, planning, personnel, 
capital improvement, and day-to-day operations-must be 
discovered and strengthened. Third, productivity gain will 
probably result from the cumulative effect of many 
incremental improvements, so attention should be turned 
to as many components of productivity as possible 
(NYSTF, 197 5). 
MEASUREMENT SYSTEMS 
The formation of performance measurement systems is 
not an easy task in the public sector. As previously noted, 
there are several differences between business and govern­
ment that make assessment of operations in the latter much 
more complex. 
In spite of the difficulty in forming these measures, 
governmental jurisdictions in increasing numbers are dis­
covering the necessity of formal performance measures. 
Demands from legislative bodies and citizens for informa­
tion on what public agencies are doing and how well they 
are doing it has increased pressure on the public manager to 
\ 
offer verifiable justification of agency efforts. Indeed, the 
increasing demand for public sector effectiveness and 
efficiency has increased the public manager's awareness of 
the need for effectiveness and efficiency measures as an 
integral part of management. 
In the development and implementation of a perfor­
mance measurement system, provision must be made for a 
multitude of variables, including the needs of agency 
management, employee response and participation, and 
demands of central executive officers and the legislative 
body, as well as questions concerning what is to be 
measured and how it is to be measured. In dealing with 
these developmental and operational questions, public 
managers must be aware of what performance measures are 
not and cannot do, as well as what they are and how they 
can be used. 
In the development of a performance measutement 
system, state governments must be aware of the limitations 
of performance measures. The manager who intends to use 
performance measures as a solution to all management 
problems will be extremely disappointed. It is important to 
dispel any exaggerated anticipation associated with a 
performance measurement system. With recognition of the 
limitations of performance measurement as well as the 
value of these measures, an effective system can be 
developed. 
As previously stated, it is important to realize that 
measuring productivity is not the same as productivity 
improvement. Although the mere existence of performarice 
measures may have a positive psychological effect on the 
operations of an organization, little significant improve­
ment can be expected from a so-called productivity effort 
in which the emphasis is on measurement alone. Perfor­
mance measurement has utility in conjunction with efforts 
to improve productivity. In additibn to the presence of 
performance measures, an organization must be able to 
analyze and use this information in relation to its manage­
ment functions. Performance measures must be considered 
as only one element of a comprehensive productivity 
enhancement program. 
A second important aspect of performance measures is 
that they have limited value when used on a one-time basis 
(Wise and McGregor, 1975). A performance measure derives 
most of its significance when compared to previous 
measurements or to a standard drawn from previous measure­
ments or program objectives. Because of this, performance 
measures are most meaningful when taken systematically 
over a period of time. 
Public managers using performance measures as a single­
shot technique in a productivity improvement effort will 
probably be disappointed in the result. A single measure­
ment exercise may provide some insight into the relative 
performance of different organizational units, but is not 
likely to offer many clues to the reasons for these 
differences. An executive may decide that quantified 
performance measures are not an effective· evaluation 
method when in fact the technique was not used properly. 
Placed in the proper perspective, a performance measure­
ment system can be a valuable management aid, providing 
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specific information that could not be obtained as easily or 
reliably by other methods. Probably the most important 
aspect of performance measures is that they are indicators 
of change (OMB, et al., 1973). Considered along with other 
operational infonnation, performance measures can provide 
a clue to the cause of a trouble area or the occurrence of 
performance improvement. By tracking performance 
measures over time, along with other variables in the agency 
environment, insignts can often be derived concerning the 
interrelationship among operating variables and perfor­
mance. Used properly, performance measures give 
management the basis for the analysis of change, positive or 
negative, and the impetus to make .appropriate adjustments. 
Besides their utility as management indicators, per­
formance measurements can have value as psychological 
motivators. Contingent on a well-planned implementation 
that is not threatening to management or employees, 
performance measurement systems can create a produc­
tivity consciousness in these groups (NYSSTF, 1975). The 
existence of these indicators enables employees or managers 
to see the results of their efforts and can spur them to do a 
more effective and efficient job. 
Implementation and Elements ofa 
Performance Measurement System 
The ultimate worth of a performance measurement . 
system is dependent upon the elements included in the 
system. As with the introduction of any new program, 
some initial anxiety can be expected. The initiator of a 
productivity program must be sensitive to this anxiety or 
may find this anxiety transformed into hostility. This may 
be even more important in the implementation of the 
performance measurement system when these measure­
ments serve an evaluative function. 
At the same time that the implementor considers 
anxieties within the organization, he must also be aware 
that these anxieties must not be accommodated by elim­
inating the crucial elements of a good performance mea­
surement system. The best way to reduce such anxiety is to 
make a determined effort to include all organizational 
members in the developmental process. 
The use of a highly participatory development process 
not only tends to reduce anxieties, but also introduces 
different perspectives into the planning stage. The value of 
this broad participation can be easily understood. For 
example, non-management employees are probably more 
aware of the nature of the jobs they actually perform, 
which is a determination that must be made in the 
formation of performance measures. The participation of 
these employees should help refine the measures so that 
they reflect the actual activities conducted by the agency. 
Similarly, different levels of management have different 
information needs, so their input can help assure that a 
flexible and responsive system Will be developed. 
In determining the elements to be included in a 
performance measurement system, there are several con­
siderations. The first of these is determination · of the 
purposes that the system is to serve. Normally, a per­
formance measurement system developed only for use in 
budget justifications will be less sophisticated than a system 
designed as an agency management tool. At the onset of the 
development stage, the goals and purposes of the system 
need to be clearly defined and communicated to all levels 
of the organization. 
Closely related to the determination of the system 
objectives is the development of the measures to be used. 
As discussed in the Introduction, there are two basic types 
of measurement: efficiency and effectiveness. In the devel­
opment of these performance measures, there are many 
issues and potential problems with which participants must 
deal. The proper handling of these issues is important in 
avoiding the commonly found problem of "perverse 
measurement" (Hatry, 1972). "Perverse measurement" 
refers to measures· which exaggerate the productivity of 
the unit measured. In a more general way, any measure 
which does not accurately reflect actual productivity can be 
considered "perverse." A measurement is just as perverse 
if it understates productivity as it is perverse when it exag­
gerates this productivity. As we will see, many perverse 
measurements are a result of incomplete identification of 
inputs and outputs of an activity. 
An example of a perverse measurement resulting from 
incomplete accounting of inputs is the situation in which 
only one· major· activity input, such as manpower, is 
identified, but is used to represent total resource use. If a 
heavy investment in technology reduces the manpower 
requirements for the activity, there will be a corresponding 
increase in productivity as "measured" by a performance 
measure in which the only input recorded is manpower. In 
this case the effect of not including capital investment as an 
input is that the performance measure exaggerates the 
productivity of the activity. 
To reduce perversity in performance measures an at­
tempt must be made to: 
(1) Break down overlapping inputs. Where a resource, 
such as a manager, is utilized in several activities, 
an attempt should be made to assign appropriate 
amounts of time and cost to the various activities. 
(2) Depreciate capital costs over the life of the 
investment. It is important in terms of the validity 
of a performance measure that only the actual 
depreciation of an investment during .a measure­
ment period be attributed as an activity input. If 
the entire cost of a capital investment is attributed 
to an initial measurement period, the initial 
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measure will lack comparability with future 
measures, and will result in perversity in future 
measures. 
(3) Include indirect costs in input determinations 
where possible. The indirect costs of an activity 
result from the unavailability of the resources used 
for other purposes. Though it is difficult to fix this 
cost, an attempt should be made since the choice 
of one activity over another may have indirect and 
direct costs for society. 
In addition to defining inputs, the development of 
performance measures requires a corresponding definition 
of outputs. This statement may seem obvious, but in the 
process of developing performance measurements it may be 
discovered that there is not a clear understanding of the 
activity outputs. One common mistake is to confuse 
workload measures for program outputs. In fact, workload 
measures provide no information· on the actual service 
delivered to a client group or the effectiveness of that 
service. Where outputs are of a physical nature such as 
highway mileage built, output determinations are relatively 
easy to make and can be used in efficiency determination. 
But as pointed out · in · Chapter I, there is generally a lack of 
qualitative information available concerning program out­
puts. 
Even when effectiveness measures are of questionable 
validity, there is still reason for an agency to go through the 
process of measurement formulation. At the very least, the 
attempt at formulating adequate performance measures 
forces management to consider carefully agency goals, 
activities, and performance in clearly defined ways 
(NYSSTF, 1975). In many cases, this focusing will in itself 
bring a vast improvement to the previously unfocused 
operations. 
A remaining issue in the formation of a performance 
measurement system is the comprehensiveness of the 
system. All performance measurement systems do not have 
to be highly sophisticated. In fact, it is much more 
important that agencies give attention to improving pro­
ductivity rather than to refining the measurement system 
(OMB, et al., 1973). Where possible, productivity measures 
should be simple and inexpensive by-products of current 
work measurement systems (OMB, et al., 1973). 
But while care should be taken to avoid overburdening 
an organization with performance measurement to the 
extent that the obtaining of data disrupts essential activi­
ties, it is also important to make the system sufficiently 
comprehensive to meet all the informational needs. For 
in~tance, the nature of the performance measures desired 
by a central budget agency will be somewhat different from 
the informational needs of an agency executive. 
Another justification for the comprehensive measuring 
of an agency's performance relates to the complex nature 
of most agency functions and the desire for validity in 
evaluating these functions. Since few agencies are homo­
geneous in their activities, it is illogical to assume that a 
single measure can gauge the scope of their programs,. For 
example, a service delivery program should measure not 
only the number of clients processed, but such factors as 
the result of processing, satisfaction of the client, and 
overall effect on the problem addressed by the program. 
MOTIVATION IN STATE GOVERNMENT 
Productivity improvement will have to be achieved by 
people working in the particular , environment of state 
government. They will be asked to scrutinize present 
operations and in many cases alter them~ The process of 
change will depend heavily on the success of the produc­
tivity effort in motivating state employees to accept and 
participate willingly in this challenge. 
Motivation is, of course, a complex subject. Balk 
(1975a) and his associates, who have written frequently on 
this aspect of productivity, define three types of behavior 
that an improvement program must affect: individual 
behavior, group behavior, and organizational behavior. This 
section will focus primarily on motivating desired individual 
behavior. In so doing, it should be remembered that 
motivating productivity improvement in the public sector is 
markedly different than it is in the private sector. The 
influence of. surrounding social and political forces is more 
complex and more readily felt, and technical agency 
experts alone do not possess the authority to get the job 
done {Balk, 1975d). 
Reform of present governmental practices bearing on 
individual employee behavior can yield substantial benefits. 
At present, there is a lack of visible and effective incentive 
systems for managers and employees. Input allocations are 
not ordinarily connected to outputs in the public sector, as 
politics rather than performance often dictates the rewards 
for agencies and individuals (NYSSTF, 1975). An overrid­
ing goal in any productivity effort should be to make 
efficient and effective performance attractive by monitor­
ing results and linking them with input decisions. 
But motivation involves more than measurement. In 
fact, association of productivity with the excesses of 
Taylorism can be a stumbling block. To the extent that the 
program is seen as promoting strict, inflexible work 
standards, constant measurement, and pressures for higher 
output, resistance to change will grow. Employees will also 
fear the threat of lay-offs. To combat the negative 
connotations of past private sector analogues and the more 
routinized aspects of productivity measurement, the pro­
gram should also reflect a concern for the human 
advantages of productivity-job satisfaction, the quality of 
work life, etc. The productivity effort in Washington State, 
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for example, emphasizes "humanistic" values as well as 
efficie1tcy and effectiveness (Cadoo, 1975). 
There are a number of ways to approach motivation. In 
the beginning, productivity programs should react to the 
fears and desires of state workers. Ideas should be solicited, 
orientation and training should be provided where appro­
priate, the benefits of the program should be delineated, · 
and reasons for becoming involved should be given (Balk, 
1975a). 
As discussed earlier, productivity programs should 
address such management improvement issues as enhanced 
flexibility for managers, greater _delegation of authority, 
and new career development opportunities. These changes 
should increase the enthusiasm of managers for the produc­
tivity effort and should stimulate their performance. In 
addition, attention should be given to broader participation 
in goal-setting throughout the agency, perhaps through an 
MBO program. Total agency involvement should encourage 
individual and group motivation (Weeks, 1975). 
Cash incentives are a popular way of eliciting productive 
performances from individuals. · These can be offered 
through a variety ·of mechanisms. First, they can take the 
form of either flat cash payments or a certain percentage of 
~onies verified as being saved. Second, they can be made 
available to individual employees or on a department-wide 
or statewide basis. Third, they . can be integrated. into 
collective bargaining agreements or suggestion systems, or 
be introduced by other means. The criteria for the awards 
can differ, for example, . economies realized or improve­
ments in the quality of service. 
There have been a number of experiments with wage 
incentive possibilities. The case study in this report refers 
to some efforts and the National Commission on Produc-: 
tivity has depicted many others (NCOP, 1975). There are 
obviously problems that need to be considered, such as 
verification of results, balancing the various . elements of 
productivity (efficiency and effectiveness), equity of 
rewards, and union attitudes, before such incentives should 
be used. 
' An exciting innovation attempted by Wisconsin, the 
productivity reinvestment program, offers some hope of 
future motivational efficacy. The essence of the idea, as 
described in this report, is to return a portion of identified 
savings to agencies for reinvestment in projects that promise 
to increase productivity even further. Although pitfalls to 
this approach are evident, it merits further exploration. 
Related incentive systems include revised promotion 
policies and the bestowal of status. By making job 
pe~formance or results displayed in the productivity pro­
gram more central to promotion schemes, new advancement 
opportunities can be provided and motivation strengthened. 
Positive reinforcement can be given to employees when 
their accomplishments are officially recognized through 
proclamations, · awards, publications, or banquets. However, 
such mechanisms can easily become trivial events with little 
meaning. 
Another path toward motivation is the negative one of 
punishinent for failure to achieve mandated objectives. All 
employees, of course, should be held accountable for their 
performance, and poor performance deserves scrutiny and 
corrective action. It is true that fear of punishment (such as 
loss of job, demotion, budget cuts) can in some circum­
stances lead to increased productivity. But a positive 
approach, . with emphasis on new challenges and rewards, 
should result in better long-range performance than a 
punitive or pressure-laden approach. 
A final subject relating to motivation that must be 
considered is the role of employee organizations and 
unions, particularly as collective bargaining becomes more 
widespread in state governments. These employee groups 
exist to protect and strengthen the well-being and job 
security of their members. They are likely to react 
negatively to productivity programs, with the usual fears of 
job cutbacks and work speedups. They may be suspicious 
of measurement processes and changes in personnel policies 
and management· practices. Productivity reward systems 
may create difficulties in contract negotiations by dividing 
large collective bargaining units into winners and losers. All 
of these factors are heightened ·by the emerging political 
clout of public employees (Lentz, 1975). 
Adversary relations and confrontational styles between 
government man~gement and workers are becoming more . 
prevalent. fu this environment, a productivity campaign 
may be viewed as a hostile gesture or at least as a reform 
not in the best interests of state employees. Moreover, 
labor-management . conflict re~olution in the public sector 
requires excessive time in some jurisdictions and becomes a 
hindrance to productive government. 
Obviously, new procedures to arrive at speedier and less 
ritualistic or adversary-type settlement of disputes would be 
helpful. New modes of communication between these 
groups, besides collective bargaining, may be needed 
(Sperry, 1975). There . should be systematic consultation 
and involvement of workers in any productiVity program. 
Also, we have recommended alternatives to layoffs and a 
concern for job satisfaction and other aspects of the quality 
of working life. These approaches should work to offset the 
problems listed earlier and to fortify the motivation of 
employees to accept and aid productivity improvement. 
The issues raised in this report are meant to stimulate 
the thinking about productivity programs. The state of the 
art in the area is such that no "certain" answers exist to 
the problems we have raised. Improved product~vity should 
be a priority in all sectors of the American economy, 
especially the public sector, and it is our hope that future 
research and programs will help achieve this critical goal. 
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